Policy

US allies are not off-limits: Israel’s Qatar strike shatters Gulf illusions

By Mohamad Hasan Sweidan

Tel Aviv’s unprecedented attack on a US-designated major non-NATO ally has warned the region that diplomatic ties and American bases offer no shield from Israeli military reach.

On 9 September, Israel launched a daylight attack on Qatar, a US “major non-NATO ally” (MNNA). The stated pretext was the assassination of Hamas leaders, whom Tel Aviv itself had previously requested that long-time mediator, Doha, continue hosting in order to maintain Washington’s indirect leverage over the movement.

But the strike served as a loud wake-up call to the entire region: There are no limits to Israel’s willingness to use military force, even against states that do not oppose it.

Why did Israel target Qatar?

Israel’s decision to strike Qatar was not taken lightly, given the high political cost. So what gains justified this move and led Tel Aviv to accept those consequences?

The primary goal was to reinforce the message that Hamas has “no safe haven” anywhere. As Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu declared on 10 September, “I say to Qatar and all nations who harbor terrorists, you either expel them or you bring them to justice. Because if you don’t, we will.”

While the operation failed to kill Hamas leaders, it marked a significant breach of what was long considered a red line: targeting Washington’s allies in the Persian Gulf region.

This raises an important question: What guarantees that Israel will not expand these attacks to other countries such as Turkiye, Egypt, or others? The Qatar strike confirmed that neither US alignment nor geographic distance offers immunity in West Asia.

As Israel’s ambassador to Washington, Yechiel Leiter, told Fox News, “If we didn’t get them this time, we’ll get them the next time.”

In doing so, Tel Aviv aimed to intimidate other Hamas-friendly states and assert dominance over the escalation ladder – even at the risk of alienating Abraham Accords signatories and complicating Washington’s normalization drive.

The second goal is related to timing. The Israeli strike coincided with Hamas leaders reviewing a US-brokered ceasefire proposal for Gaza. Israel sought to achieve two things: first, to force Qatar to withdraw from its mediator role by making it prohibitively costly; and second, to assassinate the chief negotiator himself, Khalil al-Hayya.

Such actions would derail diplomacy and open the door for Netanyahu to prolong the war until his core objective is achieved, which is to occupy Gaza and eliminate or expel all proponents of resistance – effectively ending the armed struggle in the enclave.

The third goal was to demonstrate that Tel Aviv’s new security doctrine is no longer constrained by geography or politics. Although Israel has long had the region’s strongest military, it previously sought to limit its engagements to countering immediate threats and restoring calm. Today, the aim is no longer containment but the total defeat of its enemies.

Foreign Affairs piece co-authored by Meir Ben-Shabbat – head of the Misgav Institute for National Security and Zionist Strategy in Jerusalem, former Israeli national security advisor and National Security Council chief (2017–2021) – and Asher Fredman, senior fellow at Misgav and former adviser to Israel’s strategic affairs minister, lays it bare:

“Israel’s targeted killings of senior leaders in Iran, Lebanon, Qatar, and elsewhere show that Israel no longer adheres to redlines that its neighbors believed it would never cross. Israel will not grant immunity to any leaders of hostile groups, no matter their political title or location, if Israel believes they are involved in terrorist activity. In the past, Israel would generally have carried out these actions in a low-profile manner or tried to hide its role in them, but now its leaders openly embrace these moves.”

Despite being the region’s most powerful military force, “Israel is not a regional hegemon – nor does it seek to be one.” Instead, the article argues, Tel Aviv seeks to shape the regional order to a greater degree than ever before.

A fourth, though secondary, motive was to punish Qatar’s media apparatus, particularly Al Jazeera, for its Gaza war coverage. The Qatari media has played a central role in amplifying the Palestinian narrative globally.

Since 2024, Israel has sought legal and operational tools to curb the channel: The Knesset passed a provisional “foreign broadcasters” law allowing the prime minister and communications minister to shut down networks deemed security threats for 45-day renewable periods.

Netanyahu’s office pledged immediate action against Al Jazeera; weeks later, the cabinet ordered the channel to cease Israeli platform broadcasts, seized its equipment, and shuttered its offices. Israeli courts upheld and extended the ban, while ministers portrayed the channel as endangering occupation forces, providing a security rationale for its repeated renewals.

The attack on Qatar also served as a blunt message to its media apparatus, which is that endorsement of Hamas’s narrative now comes at a cost, and Doha must revise its media strategy.

Domestically, the strike sent a strong signal to Netanyahu’s far-right coalition partners, who had repeatedly threatened to topple his government if he made concessions in hostage and ceasefire talks. By introducing a disruptive military operation into delicate negotiations, the likelihood of unacceptable compromises was nullified.

The discourse shifted from potential prisoner swaps to demands for “total victory” and debates about deterrence costs, not diplomatic trade-offs. When a leader’s survival depends on a narrow and hardline support base, displays of resolve, even at the expense of diplomacy, become politically expedient.

The strike thus served a potent internal function. It projected strength, forestalled concessions, and preserved the narrative of inevitable and absolute triumph. A poll by Maariv showed 75 percent of Israelis supported the attack – 49 percent fully endorsed the operation and its timing, 26 percent approved but questioned its timing. Only 11 percent opposed the strike, while 14 percent declined to express an opinion.

International reactions and strategic implications

Globally, Tel Aviv rushed to frame the attack as a blow to “terrorist safe havens” and a step toward recovering Israeli captives. The narrative holds that by eliminating Hamas’s sanctuaries, pressure mounts on the group to accept any ceasefire deal – regardless of terms.

While the strike undeniably increases pressure on Hamas, the real burden falls on the Gaza-based resistance, which has proven far more resilient than Tel Aviv anticipated.

The attack on Qatar immediately triggered doubts over the utility of its security relationship with the US, which failed to prevent an assault on its own MNNA. Washington, eager to avoid fallout, quickly distanced itself from the Israeli move.

US President Donald Trump is said to have expressed deep displeasure with Israel, calling the operation a unilateral act contrary to US and Israeli interests. On 13 September, Trump met in New York with Qatari Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al-Thani, a step interpreted as damage control. White House spokeswoman Karoline Leavitt later stated Trump had assured Qatari officials “that such a thing will not happen again on their soil.”

Washington largely succeeded in mitigating fallout. Qatar’s international media office issued a statement affirming that its security and defense partnership with the US is “stronger than ever,” denying reports that Doha was reassessing its military ties with Washington.

Still, the attack exposed critical questions for regional governments: What is the value of US bases if they cannot prevent aggression from Washington’s top ally? What weight does the MNNA designation carry if Israel ignores it? If US air defenses will not protect Qatar, what will? And if Netanyahu acted without Trump’s approval (reports state Washington was given early notice), how can Trump guarantee it will not happen again?

These are the urgent questions policy-makers across West Asia must ask. The sooner they reach answers, the better equipped they’ll be to defend their sovereignty.

This was a major stress test for US credibility in the Persian Gulf and for Qatar’s trust in US protection, especially given the strategic importance of the Al-Udeid base. Yet Washington’s public rebuke of Israel, rapid high-level engagement, and Doha’s denial of any strategic reassessment suggest that damage was contained. Qatar, in fact, appears to be doubling down on its military ties with the US, hoping this will deter future Israeli aggression.

Regionally, the strike sounded alarm bells in capitals like Ankara and Cairo, both of which fear they could be Tel Aviv’s next target. Egypt has already foiled an apparent Israeli plot to target Hamas leaders in the capital.

These concerns did not begin with the Qatar attack. They date back to Netanyahu’s October 2023 threat to hunt down Hamas members wherever they may be:

“All Hamas terrorists are dead men walking – above ground, below ground, outside Gaza.”

Israel’s assault on Iran earlier this year only deepened fears. The 12-day IsraelIran war showed that deterrence in West Asia has collapsed and that Tel Aviv is ready to expand its military campaign to any country, even regional powers.

Ankara’s fears materialized swiftly. Turkish Defense Ministry spokesperson Admiral Zeki Akturk warned that Israel could “further expand its reckless attacks, as it did in Qatar, and drag the entire region, including its own country, into disaster.”

Hamas leaders regularly travel to Turkiye, and some reside there. Tel Aviv has accused Ankara of allowing Hamas to plan attacks, conduct recruitment, and raise funds on Turkish soil.

“Israel’s ability to conduct strikes with seeming impunity, often bypassing regional air defenses and international norms, sets a precedent that deeply worries Ankara,” said Serhat Suha Cubukcuoglu, director of Trends Research and Advisory’s Turkiye program.

As for Egypt, multiple media outlets reported that Cairo warned the US of “severe consequences” if Israel attempted a Qatar-style strike on its territory. According to Al Arabiya and other Saudi and Israeli media, Egypt has already reduced security coordination with Tel Aviv “until further notice.”

While these leaks reflect Cairo’s anxiety, any serious retaliation against Tel Aviv or Washington remains unlikely. Egypt is more prone to leveraging these statements to deter Israeli escalation. Cairo may also attempt to expand its mediation role in the Gaza war, especially if Qatar’s role wanes.

This would boost its influence over Hamas and raise its value in Washington’s eyes. But this line of thinking misses one key point: Israel’s ultimate objective is the eradication of all Palestinian resistance – meaning Tel Aviv has no interest in any state mediating the war.

The Gulf summit and regional fallout

On 14 September, Arab and Islamic foreign ministers gathered in Doha to draft a resolution on the Israeli attack, ahead of an emergency Arab-Islamic summit hosted by Qatar the next day. The final statement made clear that the Gulf states stopped short of taking meaningful steps against Tel Aviv or Washington.

The summit unanimously condemned the Israeli strike as a violation of sovereignty, international law, and the UN Charter. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) called for a review of the bloc’s defense posture and threat assessments, directing the joint military command to begin implementing collective deterrence mechanisms.

But these statements remain far from reality. The summit ended without any concrete measures, just firm rhetoric echoing decades of toothless Arab declarations. Ironically, the statement leaned heavily on appeals to the UN and the “international community” – two entities with a long history of failing to restrain Israeli aggression.

In short, the summit delivered nothing new. Persian Gulf states remain unwilling to confront the structural shifts unfolding in the region, particularly the evolving US–Israel agenda post-7 October 2023. The strike on Qatar was not merely a blow to its regional standing, but a signal to all regional actors, including Persian Gulf states, that Israeli missiles can and will strike if Tel Aviv deems it necessary.

For Arab states, there are no longer any “safe” spaces. Hosting US bases or facilitating diplomacy offers no protection. Israel has shown it is willing to violate those spaces if it serves its security or strategic interests.

Ultimately, this was not just an attack on Qatar. It was a broader message meant to erase long-held red lines. If left unanswered by a strong regional and international response, it risks redrawing the power map of West Asia to the benefit of Tel Aviv – and by extension, its principal backer, Washington.

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