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<\/p>\nAs 2025 drew to a close, West Asia remains convulsed by a chain reaction set off by the Arab uprisings of the 2010s. What began as civil unrest has metastasized into overlapping wars, targeted killings, and fierce geopolitical rivalries. From Libya to Sudan, from the Persian Gulf to the eastern Mediterranean, local actors are locked in escalating peripheral battles.<\/p>\n
Amid this storm, Turkiye is both participant and prize. Once seen as a pivotal NATO bridge to the region, Ankara now finds itself the focus of competing axes \u2013 with Syria once again at the heart of the confrontation.<\/p>\n
Crashes and conspiracies\u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n In November, a Turkish military C-130\u00a0crashed<\/a>\u00a0in Georgia on its return from Azerbaijan. Weeks later, on 23 December, a plane carrying Libya’s western army chief,\u00a0Mohammed al-Haddad,<\/a>\u00a0a close ally of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, crashed near Haymana, outside Ankara.\u00a0He was\u00a0in the country for high-level talks. Just prior to this, Turkiye’s parliament extended its Libya mission for two more years. Questions of sabotage are rife.<\/p>\n A day earlier, on 22 December, Israeli, Greek, and Cypriot leaders held a summit in West Jerusalem to solidify their “energy partnership” in the eastern Mediterranean. At the gathering, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu pointed a finger indirectly at Ankara,\u00a0declaring<\/a>: \u201cThose who fantasize they can reestablish their empires and their dominion over our lands\u201d should \u201cforget it.\u201d This was widely considered to reference Tukiye\u2019s\u00a0Neo-Ottoman<\/a>\u00a0ambitions.<\/p>\n The summit included discussions on forming a joint rapid response force. Military officials later signed a cooperation agreement in Nicosia, covering joint special-forces training, shared expertise on countering drone and electronic warfare threats, and an intensive schedule of air, land, and naval exercises. The unambiguous target of this pact: Turkiye.<\/p>\n Syria reshaped, borders redrawn<\/strong><\/p>\n While Israel locks in regional allies, Turkiye’s Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, Defense Minister Yasar Guler, and MIT intelligence chief Ibrahim Kalin\u00a0travelled to Damascus<\/a>. Their visit was reportedly triggered by rumors that a 10 March agreement between the transitional Syrian government and the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) had reached terms that would grant\u00a0Syrian Kurds<\/a>\u00a0the autonomous status they have long sought, with a military component. The visit, however, appears to have yielded no breakthrough.<\/p>\n Also on 23 December, the same day as the Libyan plane crash, Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff Asim Munir was in Benghazi \u2013 stronghold of the Libyan National Army (LNA), which opposes the Tripoli-based government.<\/p>\n Munir signed a military procurement deal worth about\u00a0$4 billion<\/a>. Although Ankara has long backed the Tripoli government, especially since the lynching of Muammar Gaddafi, it has also been in quiet contact with Benghazi in recent years.<\/p>\n Yet, the pivotal maritime agreement establishing an Exclusive Economic Zone was inked with Tripoli, rendering it legally void without ratification from the eastern parliament.<\/p>\n Thus, the plane crash dropped squarely into a combustible matrix of rivalries. Whatever its cause, Ankara’s regional foes are looking at the incident through a lens of suspicion.<\/p>\n Across the Red Sea, Israel’s\u00a0recognition of Somaliland<\/a>\u00a0marked another front in its shadow war with Turkiye. While Ankara invests heavily in Somalia and postures as a mediator, Tel Aviv’s move derailed efforts to reverse the country\u2019s fragmentation. Israel is\u00a0expanding its footprint<\/a>, and Turkiye is in its sights.<\/p>\n The F-35 file and NATO’s quiet betrayal<\/strong><\/p>\n Although Israel has reaped the rewards of NATO membership thanks to Turkiye’s acquiescence, Tel Aviv now sees Ankara not as a grey-zone actor but as a strategic competitor in West Asia. This shift is evidenced by Israel’s obstruction of Turkiye’s bid to rejoin the F-35 fighter jet program.<\/p>\n The US Congress, in its 2026 National Defense Authorization Act, embedded provisions safeguarding Israel’s “qualitative military edge” in such detail that Tel Aviv can easily sabotage Turkiye’s ambitions.<\/p>\n Erdogan still prefers patching things up with the US-Israel axis. But reality is moving faster. A divided Turkish public reads his\u00a0Gaza rhetoric<\/a>\u00a0in two ways: as genuine Islamic leadership or as self-serving theatre. His zigzags \u2013 blasting Israel one month, preserving trade the next \u2013 reveal a deeper logic: Erdogan is always seeking validation from Washington.<\/p>\n When relations with the west fray, he pivots\u00a0eastward<\/a>, flirting with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) or adopting the language of the Global South. But when western doors reopen, he quickly shifts course.<\/p>\n That logic has defined his foreign policy since the early\u00a0Justice and Development Party (AKP) years. From Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria to Lebanon, Libya, Yemen, and the Balkans, Erdogan consistently played within Washington\u2019s playbook.<\/p>\n The post-2010 order, which opened space for\u00a0Muslim Brotherhood<\/a>-style governments, was seized by Ankara as a historic opportunity. This drew Turkiye into alliance with Qatar, while placing it at odds with Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt.<\/p>\n But the rupture came in Syria, when Washington armed the Kurdish SDF, redrawing Erdogan\u2019s internal red lines. The failed Patriot deal and the purchase of Russian S-400s triggered US sanctions, pushing Turkiye further into diplomatic limbo.<\/p>\n Deals and derailments<\/strong><\/p>\n Isolated in the\u00a0eastern Mediterranean<\/a>\u00a0energy game, Ankara tried a reset. It reopened ties with Egypt, the UAE, and even Israel. In 2023, Erdogan and Netanyahu embraced in New York, promising energy cooperation. Netanyahu was to be welcomed in Ankara. Then came Operation Al-Aqsa Flood, and Israel\u2019s ensuing genocide in Gaza.<\/p>\n Months passed before Turkiye imposed modest\u00a0trade curbs<\/a>. Even then,\u00a0Azerbaijani oil<\/a>\u00a0flowed through the Ceyhan port, enriching Israel. Erdogan\u2019s words and deeds diverged sharply, exposing the transactional heart of his diplomacy.<\/p>\n Two decades of AKP foreign policy boil down to one brutal fact: every US-led intervention Turkiye joined has strengthened Israel. Iraq, Libya, and Syria have all been cleared of resistance infrastructure.<\/p>\n And in Syria \u2013 once the buffer between Ankara and Tel Aviv \u2013 Erdogan helped dismantle the wall himself. No wonder he once received a “Profile of Courage Award<\/a>” from the American Jewish Congress back in 2004, although it was \u201cgladly\u201d returned 10 years later over his criticism of Israel\u2019s actions in Gaza.<\/p>\n Israel redraws the war map<\/strong><\/p>\n Yet Tel Aviv now ranks Turkiye as its second most dangerous regional threat after Iran. Not because of any imminent attack, but because their\u00a0Syria projects clash<\/a>. Israel wants a demilitarized, pliant Damascus. Turkiye wants influence, bases, and a loyal armed Syrian proxy.<\/p>\n Israel has recast its brutality, from the genocide in Gaza, assaults in the West Bank, and bombing campaigns in Lebanon, to Yemen strikes and attacks on Syria and Iran, as part of a grand narrative: it intends to reshape the region through force.<\/p>\n These operations are laced with\u00a0biblical<\/a>\u00a0symbolism. For instance, Israel dubbed its 8 December 2024 campaign \u2013 which reportedly destroyed up to 90 percent of Syria\u2019s firepower \u2013 “Arrows of Bashan,” a name referencing the ancient territory east of the Golan in the Hebrew Bible. The planned buffer zone in southern Syria thus takes on the contours of a messianic map. Observers in multiple states fear they may be next.<\/p>\n Ankara sees the threat. Some fear Israel will back Kurdish factions, forcing Turkiye to reopen its Kurdish peace track. Others warn that Israel’s sabotage of Syria will sink Ankara\u2019s reconstruction and refugee return plans. And then there’s the unthinkable: that Israel aims to carve a “David’s Corridor<\/a>” from the Golan to the Euphrates. Once dismissed as conspiracy, the idea is now whispered in military circles.<\/p>\n Erdogan\u2019s narrowing exits\u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n Tel Aviv’s goal is to force Turkiye out of Syria entirely. Media proxies claim Turkiye has replaced Iran as the US’s new target. Their campaign is aimed squarely at US President Donald Trump, who they fear may curb Netanyahu\u2019s excesses and realign Washington toward a more stable Syria policy.<\/p>\n Ankara, for its part, is betting on Trump to rein in Netanyahu and maintain engagement with Damascus, hopes a Syria-Israel security deal will take shape, and believes the SDF can still be folded into the Syrian state through the 10 March framework.<\/p>\n If that fails, Erdogan wants Moscow to re-establish itself in southern Syria to curtail Israel. Some even float the idea of\u00a0Tehran’s reentry<\/a>\u00a0\u2013 via Turkish-Russian coordination \u2013 to send Tel Aviv a warning: if this path continues, the Resistance Axis may reawaken.<\/p>\n But this path risks sacrificing Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa (Abu Mohammad al-Julani), who has long been tolerated as a balancing piece. As US Ambassador\u00a0Mike Huckabee<\/a>\u00a0bluntly put it, Sharaa \u201cknows that his pathway for survival is peace with Israel.\u201d<\/p>\n Erdogan is watching Trump closely. He may help disarm Hamas, but only if Washington ensures the SDF is denied autonomy and Israel’s aggression is reined in.<\/p>\n If US strategy fails to reconcile Turkish and Israeli aims in Syria, the consequences may spill far beyond Syria. Turkiye is caught in a web of interlocked fronts. What unfolds in Gaza, Benghazi, or Somaliland inevitably echoes through Damascus.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n