{"id":2651,"date":"2024-10-21T07:40:19","date_gmt":"2024-10-21T07:40:19","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/natharatmouchrika.net\/home\/?p=2651"},"modified":"2024-10-21T07:40:19","modified_gmt":"2024-10-21T07:40:19","slug":"the-rise-of-political-islam-in-turkey","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/natharatmouchrika.net\/home\/?p=2651","title":{"rendered":"The Rise of Political Islam in Turkey"},"content":{"rendered":"
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38<\/span> The Rise of Political Islam in Turkey<\/span>
of the new ruling elite.<\/span>13<\/span> Reinterpreting the nation and state as a family<\/span>
and community, these scholars selectively used Ottoman-Islamic ideas<\/span>
to make the past relevant to the present and to cement di\ufb00ering inter-<\/span>
ests together by emphasizing the danger to family, nation, and state<\/span>
posed by ideological fragmentation. The educational system and the<\/span>
media were then used to disseminate a popularized version of the ide-<\/span>
ology to the masses.<\/span>
The architects of this ideological program hoped to create a new<\/span>
form of depoliticized Turkish-Islamic culture that would reunify soci-<\/span>
ety and provide the basis for a uni\ufb01ed, strong, and stable state. The syn-<\/span>
thesis, however, sent an ambiguous message. On one hand, under the<\/span>
1982 constitution, Turkey was de\ufb01ned as a secular state. On the other<\/span>
hand, the role of religion was strengthened in schools and education as<\/span>
a means of reinforcing Turkish nationalism, which tended to weaken<\/span>
the emphasis on secularism. At the same time, it provided opportuni-<\/span>
ties for the Islamists to expand and reinforce their own message.<\/span>
The Impact of the \u00d6zal Reforms<\/span>
The economic and political reforms carried out under Prime Minister<\/span>
Turgut \u00d6zal in the mid-1980s also contributed to strengthening the<\/span>
role of Islamic groups. The reforms weakened the state\u2019s control over<\/span>
the economy and created a new class of entrepreneurs and capitalists<\/span>
in the provincial towns of Anatolia, including Denizli, Gaziantep, and<\/span>
Kahramanmara<\/span>\u00fa<\/span>. The economic upswing created a new middle class\u2014<\/span>
the so-called \u201cAnatolian bourgeoisie\u201d\u2014with strong roots in Islamic<\/span>
culture. This group favors liberal economic policies and a reduction of<\/span>
the role of the state in the economic and social spheres. It also supports<\/span>
13<\/span> Hakan Yavuz, \u201cPolitical Islam and the Welfare (Refah) Party in Turkey,\u201d<\/span> Comparative<\/span>
Politics<\/span>, Vol. 10, No. 1, October 1997, p. 68; for the Ottoman and republican origins of the<\/span>
\u201cTurkish-Islamic synthesis,\u201d see G\u00f6khan \u00c7etinsaya, \u201cRethinking Nationalism and Islam:<\/span>
Some Preliminary Notes on the Roots of \u2018Turkish-Islamic Synthesis\u2019 in Modern Turkish<\/span>
Political Thought,\u201d<\/span> The Muslim World<\/span>, Vol. 89, Issue 3-4, October 1999, pp. 350\u2013376,<\/span>
at<\/span> http:\/\/www.blackwell-synergy.com\/doi\/abs\/10.1111\/j.1478-1913.1999.tb02753.x<\/span> (as<\/span> of<\/span>
March 21, 2008).<\/span><\/p>\n
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The Rise of Political Islam in Turkey<\/span> 39<\/span>
greater religious freedom. In the 1990s, it supported the Welfare Party.<\/span>
Today, it is one of the core constituencies backing the AKP.<\/span>
\u00d6zal\u2019s reforms also resulted in an in\ufb02ow of capital, much of it<\/span>
from the Arab world. This allowed the Islamists to organize politically.<\/span>
Under \u00d6zal\u2019s more tolerant approach to religion, Muslim groups and<\/span>
brotherhoods were given greater freedoms and were allowed to \ufb01nance<\/span>
the construction of private schools and universities. The reforms also<\/span>
opened up greater political space for new political groups\u2014including<\/span>
the Islamists. Islamist groups gained access to important media outlets<\/span>
and newspaper chains, which allowed them to reach a much broader<\/span>
political audience.<\/span>14<\/span> Television, in particular, provided an important<\/span>
means of propagating their message.<\/span>15<\/span>
Demographic changes also had an impact. The industrial and<\/span>
modernization policies pursued by successive Turkish governments led<\/span>
to a large-scale in\ufb02ux of the rural population into the cities. These<\/span>
rural migrants brought with them their traditional habits, beliefs, and<\/span>
customs. Uprooted and alienated, many lived in makeshift shanty-<\/span>
towns (<\/span>gecekondu mahallesi<\/span>) on the outskirts of large cities and were<\/span>
not integrated into urban culture. They represented an important pool<\/span>
of potential voters for Islamic parties opposed to Westernization and<\/span>
the forces of globalization, such as the series of Erbakan\u2019s<\/span> Milli G\u00f6r\u00fc\u015f<\/span>
parties (see below). At the same time, the large in\ufb02ux of migrants con-<\/span>
tributed to an internal \u201cclash of civilizations.\u201d The two Turkeys\u2014one<\/span>
secular and urban, the other rural and pious\u2014were brought into closer<\/span>
proximity with one another, exacerbating social tensions.<\/span>
In many ways, \u00d6zal embodied these clashing traditions. A<\/span>
Western-trained technocrat who had worked for the World Bank, he<\/span>
was also a supporter of the Nak<\/span>\u00fa<\/span>ibendi order and had been associated<\/span>
with Erbakan\u2019s National Salvation Party before founding the Mother-<\/span>
land Party (<\/span>Anavatan Partisi<\/span> (ANAP)) in 1983. He thus bridged the<\/span>
14<\/span> \u00f9<\/span>erif Mardin has pointed to the important role played by the expansion of the media in<\/span>
propagating the \u201cIslamic voice\u201d and contributing to the rise of Islamic political parties. See<\/span>
Mardin, \u201cTurkish Islamic Exceptionalism Yesterday and Today,\u201d p. 157.<\/span>
15<\/span> Until 1989, Turkey had only one television channel, the state-run TRT. The \ufb01rst religiously<\/span>
oriented channels began to emerge in 1993 and were linked to the G\u00fclen movement.<\/span><\/p>\n
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40<\/span> The Rise of Political Islam in Turkey<\/span>
secular-Islamic divide. As Henri Barkey noted, \u201cHe was as comfortable<\/span>
with Western leaders as in a mosque.\u201d<\/span>16<\/span>
The Rise of the Religious Right<\/span>
These economic and social changes contributed to an upsurge in the<\/span>
political strength of Islamic political groups in the 1970s and 1980s.<\/span>
Its \ufb01rst independent political expression was the establishment of the<\/span>
National Order Party (MNP) in January 1970. The MNP was the \ufb01rst<\/span>
of several Islamic parties led by Necmettin Erbakan. It advocated a<\/span>
new economic and social order based on \u201cnational\u201d (read Islamic) prin-<\/span>
ciples. However, the MNP\u2019s existence was short-lived. The party was<\/span>
shut down after a military intervention in 1971 on the grounds that it<\/span>
was against the secular nature of the state.<\/span>
The founders of the MNP and its successors came out of the<\/span>
National View (<\/span>Milli G\u00f6r\u00fc\u015f<\/span>) movement,<\/span>17<\/span> whose leaders sought a return<\/span>
to traditional values and institutions. They regarded the Kemalist<\/span>
attempt to replace the Islamic-Ottoman state and culture with a West-<\/span>
ern model as a historic mistake and the source of all the ills in Turkish<\/span>
society. Their goal was to build a \u201cnational (Islamic) order\u201d and put<\/span>
an end to the process of Westernization.<\/span>18<\/span> They saw Turkey\u2019s identity<\/span>
and future closely linked with the Muslim world, rather than with the<\/span>
West.<\/span>
The National Salvation Party (<\/span>Milli Selamet Partisi<\/span> (MSP)) was<\/span>
founded in October 1972. Like the MNP, which was closed in May<\/span>
1971, the MSP fused Islam and Turkish nationalism. The MSP\u2019s slogan<\/span>
was \u201cA Great Turkey Once Again\u201d (\u201c<\/span>Yeniden B\u00fcy\u00fck T\u00fcrkiye\u201d<\/span>). The par-<\/span>
ty\u2019s proposed solution to Turkey\u2019s problems was to return to Islam\u2019s<\/span>
16<\/span> Barkey, \u201cThe Struggles of a \u2018Strong\u2019 State,\u201d p. 99.<\/span>
17<\/span> For background on the<\/span> Milli G\u00f6r\u00fc\u015f<\/span> movement and its philosophy, see Fulya Atacan,<\/span>
\u201cExplaining Religious Politics at the Crossroad: AKP-SP,\u201d<\/span> Turkish Studies<\/span>, Vol. 6, No. 2,<\/span>
June 2005, pp. 187\u2013199.<\/span>
18<\/span> See Ihsan D. Da<\/span>\u00f7<\/span>i, \u201cTransformation of Islamic Political Identity in Turkey: Rethinking<\/span>
the West and Westernization,\u201d<\/span> Turkish Studies<\/span>, Vol. 6, No. 1, March 2005, pp. 21\u201337.<\/span><\/p>\n
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The Rise of Political Islam in Turkey<\/span> 41<\/span>
teachings and a \u201cMuslim way of life.\u201d The MNP declared that the pro-<\/span>
cess of Westernization had fragmented Turkish society and led to a loss<\/span>
of grandeur and that a policy of industrialization, based on \u201cnative\u201d<\/span>
heavy industry created by Anatolian capital, would create a strong<\/span>
nation that would turn its back on the West and become the leader<\/span>
of the Muslim world. In place of ties to the West, the MSP favored<\/span>
the creation of a Muslim Common Market, with the Islamic<\/span> dinar<\/span>
as its common currency, and the development of a Muslim Defense<\/span>
Alliance.<\/span>19<\/span>
The MSP was a coalition of di\ufb00erent Islamic and conservative<\/span>
groups. While the party\u2019s leader, Necmettin Erbakan, maintained tight<\/span>
political control, there were con\ufb02icts from the outset among the di\ufb00er-<\/span>
ent groups and religious orders over the party\u2019s political orientation, as<\/span>
well as over Erbakan\u2019s authoritarian leadership style.<\/span> 20<\/span> These political<\/span>
and ideological divisions became more pronounced after Erbakan\u2019s ill-<\/span>
fated tenure as prime minister (1996\u20131997) and eventually resulted in<\/span>
the split in the movement in 2001 that gave rise to the AKP.<\/span>
In the 1970s, the MSP established itself as an important actor in<\/span>
Turkish political life. It gained third place in the 1973 election, with 12<\/span>
percent of the vote and 11 percent of the seats in parliament. Erbakan<\/span>
formed a coalition government with the CHP, becoming deputy prime<\/span>
minister under B\u00fclent Ecevit. After the coalition collapsed, the MSP<\/span>
joined the National Front governments headed by S\u00fcleyman Demirel<\/span>
in 1975 and 1977.<\/span>
After the military coup in 1980, the MSP was closed down, and<\/span>
Erbakan and his lieutenants were banned from political activities for<\/span>
ten years. However, the party reemerged in 1983 under a new name\u2014<\/span>
the Welfare Party (<\/span>Refah Partisi<\/span> (RP)). Welfare\u2019s ideology di\ufb00ered little<\/span>
from that of the MSP. It expressed the same hostility to Westernization<\/span>
19<\/span> On the MSP\u2019s program and ideology, see Jacob Landau, \u201cThe National Salvation Party in<\/span>
Turkey,\u201d<\/span> Asian and African Studies<\/span>, Vol. 11, 1976, pp. 1\u201357. Also Binnaz Toprak, \u201cPoliticiza-<\/span>
tion of Islam in a Secular State,\u201d in Said Arjomand (ed.),<\/span> From Nationalism to Revolutionary<\/span>
Islam<\/span>, London: Macmillan, 1984, pp. 119\u2013133, and Binnaz Toprak, \u201cIslam and Democracy<\/span>
in Turkey,\u201d<\/span> Turkish Studies<\/span>, Vol. 6, No. 2, June 2005, pp. 187\u2013199.<\/span>
20<\/span> For a detailed discussion of the political and ideological struggles within the MSP, see<\/span>
Atacan, \u201cExplaining Religious Politics at the Crossroad: AKP-SP,\u201d pp. 187\u2013199.<\/span><\/p>\n
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42<\/span> The Rise of Political Islam in Turkey<\/span>
and the same anti-Western bias. Its economic program, \u201cJust Order,\u201d<\/span>
stressed the need for greater social justice and equality and an end to<\/span>
undue Western in\ufb02uence. In foreign policy, Welfare advocated cut-<\/span>
ting Turkey\u2019s ties to the West and closer integration with the Muslim<\/span>
world.<\/span>
In the 1987 elections, Welfare received 7.16 percent of the vote\u2014<\/span>
short of the 10 percent needed for representation in parliament. As<\/span>
a result, the religious right was not represented as a separate party<\/span>
in parliament during the 1980s. Many of Welfare\u2019s adherents joined<\/span>
\u00d6zal\u2019s Motherland Party (ANAP), which brought together religious<\/span>
and bureaucratic secular conservatives under one roof, siphoning o\ufb00<\/span>
support from the religious right that otherwise would have gone to<\/span>
Welfare.<\/span>
Political Islam in Power: The Welfare Interlude<\/span>
Political Islam witnessed a strong resurgence in the early 1990s. In the<\/span>
March 1994 local elections, the Welfare Party received 19 percent of<\/span>
the vote and won the mayor\u2019s o\ufb03ce in 28 municipalities, including<\/span>
Turkey\u2019s two largest cities, Istanbul and Ankara. In the 1995 national<\/span>
elections, Welfare came in \ufb01rst with 21.6 percent of the vote and<\/span>
formed a coalition with the right-of-center True Path Party (the succes-<\/span>
sor to Demirel\u2019s Justice Party), with Erbakan as prime minister. Wel-<\/span>
fare\u2019s stunning victory sent shock waves throughout the secular estab-<\/span>
lishment, especially the military. For the \ufb01rst time since the founding<\/span>
of the Turkish Republic in 1923, Turkey was run by an Islamist party,<\/span>
with an Islamist prime minister.<\/span>
Several factors contributed to Welfare\u2019s strong showing. Perhaps<\/span>
most important was a shift in Welfare\u2019s political agenda, which put<\/span>
stronger emphasis on social issues rather than religious themes.<\/span> 21<\/span> This<\/span>
allowed Welfare to broaden its appeal beyond the hard-core religious<\/span>
right. At the same time, Welfare\u2019s populist but catchy Just Order pro-<\/span>
21<\/span> Da<\/span>\u00f7<\/span>i, \u201cTransformation of Islamic Political Identity,\u201d p. 25.<\/span><\/p>\n
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The Rise of Political Islam in Turkey<\/span> 43<\/span>
gram allowed it to gain important support among the urban poor who<\/span>
traditionally had voted for the CHP.<\/span>
Welfare was the best organized of all the political parties, with a<\/span>
legion of devout Muslims, especially women, who did volunteer work<\/span>
for the party and provided a network of social-welfare help to the poor.<\/span>
The party\u2019s grassroots network was extremely e\ufb00ective, working in the<\/span>
gecekondu<\/span> and other poor urban areas, helping residents to \ufb01nd jobs,<\/span>
providing hospital and health care, distributing free food, and provid-<\/span>
ing other social amenities.<\/span> 22<\/span>
Welfare also bene\ufb01ted from a strong anti-Western backlash gen-<\/span>
erated by the EU\u2019s rejection of Turkey\u2019s membership application at its<\/span>
December 1989 summit, which was seen by many Turks as motivated<\/span>
by cultural and religious biases, as well as by the West\u2019s failure to stop<\/span>
the killing of Muslims in Bosnia. The increasing disappointment with<\/span>
the West gave resonance to Welfare\u2019s strong anti-Western rhetoric.<\/span>
However, once in o\ufb03ce, Welfare showed little capacity for<\/span>
addressing Turkey\u2019s mounting domestic problems. Erbakan found it<\/span>
di\ufb03cult to balance his anti-system campaign rhetoric with the need to<\/span>
consider the interests of the secular establishment, which was highly<\/span>
suspicious of his political goals, as well as of his commitment to democ-<\/span>
racy. Instead of pursuing policies designed to reduce social tensions,<\/span>
Erbakan further polarized Turkish society along secular-Islamic lines.<\/span>
He angered hard-core Islamist supporters by accepting a customs union<\/span>
with the EU and continuing to honor treaties with Israel that he had<\/span>
promised to annul. At the same time, he in\ufb02amed the secular establish-<\/span>
ment by saying that rectors of universities would have to kiss the hands<\/span>
of female students wearing headscarves (the wearing of headscarves was<\/span>
forbidden in universities) and threatening to build a mosque in Taksim<\/span>
Square, a major public transportation hub in the heart of Istanbul.<\/span> 23<\/span>
22<\/span> On Welfare\u2019s grassroots organization, see in particular Jenny B. White<\/span>, Islamic Mobiliza-<\/span>
tion in Turkey: A Study in Vernacular Politics<\/span>, Seattle and London: University of Washing-<\/span>
ton Press, 2002. Also Yavuz, \u201cPolitical Islam and the Welfare (Refah) Party in Turkey,\u201d pp.<\/span>
71\u201373, and Toprak, \u201cIslam and Democracy in Turkey,\u201d p. 181.<\/span>
23<\/span> The \ufb01rst Erdo<\/span>\u00f7<\/span>an-led municipal government of Istanbul tried to revive the Taksim Square<\/span>
mosque project, as well as another mosque project on the European side, in G\u00f6ztepe Park.<\/span>
Both projects were shelved because of public opposition.<\/span><\/p>\n
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44<\/span> The Rise of Political Islam in Turkey<\/span>
Moreover, in his \ufb01rst months in o\ufb03ce, Erbakan undertook a number<\/span>
of foreign-policy initiatives\u2014including an ill-fated trip to Libya and<\/span>
the promotion of an Islamic economic grouping (the D-8) as an alter-<\/span>
native to the EU\u2014that indicated that he intended to push an Islamist<\/span>
foreign policy.<\/span>
These moves, together with Erbakan\u2019s often intemperate rhetoric,<\/span>
alarmed the secular establishment, particularly the military. However,<\/span>
rather than intervening directly, as it had in 1960, 1971, and 1980,<\/span>
the military used more-subtle and indirect methods to force Erbakan\u2019s<\/span>
ouster. On February 28, 1997, the National Security Council\u2014which<\/span>
was dominated by the military\u2014presented Erbakan with a list of rec-<\/span>
ommendations to curb anti-secular activity.<\/span> 24<\/span> When Erbakan balked at<\/span>
implementing the recommendations, the military held a series of brief-<\/span>
ings and mobilized the secular establishment against him, eventually<\/span>
forcing him to resign in June 1997 in what has been termed a \u201csilent\u201d<\/span>
or \u201cpost-modern\u201d coup. In January 1998, the Welfare Party was closed<\/span>
down, and Erbakan and his key lieutenants were banned from politics<\/span>
for \ufb01ve years.<\/span>
The Impact of the February 28 Process<\/span>
The \u201cFebruary 28 process,\u201d as the military\u2019s e\ufb00ort to force Erbakan\u2019s<\/span>
resignation is termed in Turkey, was an important political watershed.<\/span>
It marked the abandonment of the idea that religion could be used to<\/span>
consolidate society, which had been at the root of the Turkish-Islamic<\/span>
synthesis. Thereafter, the military embarked on an overt campaign<\/span>
against Islamist ideas and ideology, which together with Kurdish sepa-<\/span>
ratism was singled out as one of the main threats to Turkish security.<\/span>
At the same time, the February 28 process had an important<\/span>
impact on the orientation and development of the Islamist movement.<\/span>
It underscored the fact that a direct, head-on attempt to push an overt<\/span>
24<\/span> For the text of the military\u2019s February 28 recommendations in English and an analysis of<\/span>
the February 28 process and its aftermath, see Niyazi Gunay, \u201cImplementing the \u2018February<\/span>
28\u2019 Recommendations: A Scorecard,\u201d<\/span> Research Notes No. 10<\/span>, Washington Institute for Near<\/span>
East Policy, May 2001.<\/span><\/p>\n
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The Rise of Political Islam in Turkey<\/span> 45<\/span>
Islamic agenda could not succeed and would generate strong opposi-<\/span>
tion from the secularists, especially the military. Many members of the<\/span>
Islamist movement concluded that the only way the Islamists could<\/span>
succeed was by avoiding a direct confrontation with the secularists and<\/span>
deemphasizing the religious agenda.<\/span>
This recognition sparked an intense internal debate and rethink-<\/span>
ing within the Islamic movement about the movement\u2019s future politi-<\/span>
cal strategy and agenda, and a growing philosophical and political rift<\/span>
emerged within the movement between two di\ufb00erent groups. The \u201ctra-<\/span>
ditionalists\u201d (<\/span>Gelenek\u00e7iler<\/span>), centered on Erbakan and his chief lieuten-<\/span>
ant, Recai Kutan, opposed any serious change in approach or policy,<\/span>
while a younger group of \u201cmodernists,\u201d or \u201creformists\u201d (<\/span>Yenilik\u00e7iler<\/span>), led<\/span>
by Recep Tayyip Erdo<\/span>\u00f7<\/span>an, the mayor of Istanbul, and his close associ-<\/span>
ate Abdullah G\u00fcl, argued that the party needed to rethink its approach<\/span>
to a number of fundamental issues, particularly democracy, human<\/span>
rights, and relations with the West. The reformists also opposed Erba-<\/span>
kan\u2019s authoritarian leadership style and called for greater inner-party<\/span>
democracy.<\/span>
The in\ufb02uence of this internal debate was re\ufb02ected in the platform<\/span>
of the Virtue Party (<\/span>Fazilet Partisi<\/span> (FP)), which replaced the Welfare<\/span>
Party. However, while Virtue was Welfare\u2019s successor, it di\ufb00ered in a<\/span>
number of important respects. Unlike Welfare, which was ideologi-<\/span>
cally hostile to the West and Westernization, Virtue began to embrace<\/span>
Western political values. In short, anti-Westernism and suspicion of the<\/span>
West were no longer a hallmark of Islamist discourse.<\/span> 25<\/span> A timeline of<\/span>
the religious-right parties is shown in Figure 3.1.<\/span>
After the Virtue Party was shut down by the Constitutional Court<\/span>
in June 2001, the movement formally split. The traditionalists estab-<\/span>
lished the Felicity Party (<\/span>Saadet Partisi<\/span> (SP)), under the formal leader-<\/span>
ship of Recai Kutan, with Erbakan exerting the real leadership behind<\/span>
the scenes. The modernists founded a new party, the AKP, with Erdogan as party chairman,this split represented a fundamental ideological
\nrift in the Milli G\u00f6r\u00fc\u015f movement.<\/span><\/div>\n

25<\/span> This shift was symbolized by Virtue\u2019s decision to take Welfare\u2019s closure and Erbakan\u2019s ban<\/span>
from politics to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). As Ihsan Da<\/span>\u00f7<\/span>i has noted,<\/span>
the decision to seek justice in Europe was particularly ironic in light of Erbakan\u2019s past sting-<\/span>
ing criticism of Europe as unjust, exploitative, and imperialistic. Da<\/span>\u00f7<\/span>i, \u201cTransformation of<\/span>
Islamic Political Identity,\u201d p. 28.<\/span><\/p>\n
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46<\/span> The Rise of Political Islam in Turkey<\/span>
Figure 3.1<\/span>
Evolution of Religious-Right Parties in Turkey<\/span>
RAND<\/span> MG726-3.1<\/span>
1990s<\/span>1980s<\/span>1970s<\/span>1960s<\/span>1950s<\/span> 2000s<\/span>
Erbakan and friends as independent MPs<\/span>
Milli Nizam Partisi (National Order Party)<\/span>
Milli Selamet Partisi (National Salvation Party)<\/span>
No political parties allowed by National<\/span>
Security Council<\/span>
I<\/span>
MNP<\/span>
MSP<\/span>
N P<\/span>
Refah Partisi (Welfare Party)<\/span>
Fazilet Partisi (Virtue Party)<\/span>
Saadet Partisi (Felicity Party)<\/span>
Adalet ve Kalk\u0131nma Partisi<\/span>
(Justice and Development Party)<\/span>
RP<\/span>
FP<\/span>
SP<\/span>
AKP<\/span>
7<\/span>6<\/span>5<\/span>4<\/span>3<\/span>2<\/span>1<\/span>0<\/span> 8 9<\/span> 7<\/span>6<\/span>5<\/span>4<\/span>3<\/span>2<\/span>1<\/span>0<\/span> 8 9<\/span> 7<\/span>6<\/span>5<\/span>4<\/span>3<\/span>2<\/span>1<\/span>0<\/span> 8 9<\/span> 7<\/span>6<\/span>5<\/span>4<\/span>3<\/span>2<\/span>1<\/span>0<\/span> 8 9<\/span> 7<\/span>6<\/span>5<\/span>4<\/span>3<\/span>2<\/span>1<\/span>0<\/span> 8 9<\/span> 7<\/span>6<\/span>5<\/span>4<\/span>3<\/span>2<\/span>1<\/span>0<\/span>
Active in center-right parties<\/span>
MNP<\/span> N P<\/span>
RP<\/span> FP<\/span>
SP<\/span>
AKP<\/span>
MSP<\/span>I<\/span>
\n<\/div>\n
Link : https:\/\/www.jstor.org\/stable\/10.7249\/mg726osd.10?seq=16<\/div>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

38 The Rise of Political Islam in Turkeyof the new ruling elite.13 Reinterpreting the nation and state as a familyand community, these scholars selectively used Ottoman-Islamic ideasto make the past relevant to the present and to cement di\ufb00ering inter-ests together by emphasizing the danger to family, nation, and stateposed by ideological fragmentation. 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