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Singapore is a religiously diverse country. The 2000 national census reports that 85 per cent
\nof the population in Singapore profess to belong to a religion, and a recent survey shows that
\nalmost 82 per cent of adolescents believe in some sort of deity (Chew, 2005). A majority of
\nthe population are Buddhists (42.5%), followed by Muslims (14.9%), Christians (14.6%),
\nTaoists (8.5%) and Hindus (4.0%) (Singapore Department of Statistics, 2000). There are also
\nadherents of other religions (0.6%) as well as those who profess to have no religion (14.8%).
\nAmong the ethnic groups, the Malays are the most homogenous with 99.6 per cent of Malays
\nwho are Muslims. The rest of the Muslims comprise a small number of Chinese, Eurasians,
\nand those of Arab and South Asian descent (Kadir, 2004). As almost all Muslims are Malays
\nin Singapore, this article shall focus on Malay-Muslims, and use the two terms, \u2018Malays\u2019 and
\n\u2018Muslims\u2019 synonymously.
\nThe religious diversity of Singapore, coupled with the current phenomenon of Islamic
\nrevivalism, makes the management of religion a paramount concern for the government.
\nGiven the fact that citizens have local and global ties and commitments beyond those to the
\nnation-state, there is a potential conflict between the national loyalty of citizens and transnational loyalty of religious believers. This is particularly relevant to the Muslims in
\nSingapore. How does the current phenomenon of Islamic revivalism and fundamentalism
\naffect the Muslims in their role as Singapore Muslims? How does it affect the relationship
\nbetween Muslims and non-Muslims in Singapore? What are the implications of Islamic
\nrevivalism for citizenship education in Singapore? These are the questions that will be
\nexplored in this paper. By examining the developments of Islam in Singapore, the paper
\nexplores the challenges and implications these developments have on citizenship education in
\nthe country. This paper explains that citizenship in Singapore is characterised by \u201ccivic
\nrepublicanism\u201d where the emphasis is on passive, rule-following citizenship. The paper also<\/p>\n
discusses the concept of \u201creligious pragmatism\u201d in Singapore where the government adopts a
\nutilitarian approach towards religions and aims to promote religious harmony in citizenship
\neducation. This paper argues that there is a need for a form of citizenship education in
\nSingapore which takes into consideration the multiplicity, complexity and intersection of
\nreligion and citizenship. It is further argued that what is needed in citizenship education in
\nSingapore is not just socialisation into a particular state-sanctioned set of values and views,
\nbut an awareness and appreciation of other religions, especially Islam.
\nAn Introduction to Islam and Islamic Education in Singapore
\nIslam was spread to Southeast Asia around the 14th century by Arab and Indian traders.
\nThough the sultans\u2019 conversion, a Muslim community was formed in Singapore at the
\nbeginning of the 19th century, comprising South Asians and Arab Muslims (Siddique, 1986,
\nquoted in Kadir, 2004). When Singapore became a British colony in the 19th century, the
\nBritish, while recognising the sultans as guardians of the Islamic faith, tried to impose secular
\nlaws over shar\u2019iah or Islamic laws and control the Islamic bureaucracy (Mutalib, 2004). To
\nfacilitate the communication between the British and the Muslims, the Muslim Endowments
\nBoard was set up in 1906 and the Muhammedan (sic) Advisory Board in 1915 so that the
\nMuslim representatives could negotiate with the British government regarding the
\nadministration of Muslim affairs (Kadir, 2004). The introduction of the Muslim Ordinance in
\n1957 and the establishment of the Shariah Court in 1958 formally placed the Muslims in
\nSingapore under the Islamic law, shariah. After Singapore\u2019s independence in 1965, the
\nSingapore government wanted a central body to govern and administer Muslim affairs. The
\nMajlis Ugama Islam Singapura (MUIS), also known as the Islamic Religious Council of
\nSingapore, was established in 1968 as a statutory body to advise the President of Singapore
\non all matters relating to Islam in Singapore. MUIS\u2019 mission is to broaden and deepen the
\nSingaporean Muslim Community’s understanding and practice of Islam, while enhancing the
\nwell being of the nation (MUIS, 2005). This is done by setting the Islamic agenda, shaping
\nreligious life and forging the Singaporean Muslim identity. It promotes religious, social,
\neducational, economic and cultural activities for the Muslims in accordance with the
\nprinciples and traditions of Islam as enshrined in the Holy Quran and Sunnah. Among its
\nprincipal functions are the administration of pilgrimage affairs and halal certification, the
\nconstruction and administration of mosques development and management, and the
\nadministration of Islamic religious schools and Islamic education.
\nIn terms of education, Muslim children receive an Islamic education from a young age
\nfrom their family as well as the mosques and \u201cmadrasah\u201d which are Islamic religious schools.
\nUnder the Administration of Muslim Law Act, all the madrasah in Singapore came under the
\ncontrol of MUIS. Historically, madrasah were built by Muslim philantrophists to provide
\nIslamic education for Muslim children and the earliest one was Madrasah Alsagoff AlArabiyah in 1912. Under the Education Act, each madrasah has its management committee
\nwhose members are appointed by Ministry of Education (MOE) in consultation with MUIS.
\nThere are currently six full-time madrasah and twenty-seven part-time mosque madrasah in
\nSingapore. The madrasah aim to produce the religious elites to lead the community on
\nreligious matters, while mosque madrasah provide part-time basic Islamic education to
\nstudents who attend government schools (Our Madrasah, n.d.). Both religious subjects such
\nas Islamic Education and Arabic language, and secular subjects such as English and
\nMathematics are taught in the madrasah. Students enrolled in these madrasah sit for national
\nexaminations set by the Ministry of Education (MOE): the Primary School Leaving
\nExamination (PSLE) at the end of the primary school, and the Cambridge Board General
\nCertificate of Education (GCE) examinations for secondary and pre-university students. On the other hand, mosque madrasah only offer basic religious subjects since its students are
\nalready attending full-time government schools and taking the national examinations as part
\nof the requirements by MOE. Besides the mosques and madrasah, Muslims may also receive
\nreligious instructions from private Islamic kindergartens, and programmes and activities
\norganized by Muslim organizations such as MENDAKI and People\u2019s Association Malay
\nActivity Coordinating Council (Mesra).
\nIslamic Revivalism and Challenges for Singapore
\nA number of writers have noted the phenomenon of Islamic revivalism in Southeast Asia and
\nthe Re-Islamisation in Singapore (Desker, 2003; Kadir, 2004; Millard, 2004a; Fernandez,
\n2005; E. Tan, 2005). This is evident in their attire, diet, religious observances and social
\ninteractions (e.g. \u201cDon\u2019t Arabise Malay culture\u201d, The Sunday Times, 18 April 2004; \u201cIs it
\ncool for Singapore Malays to go Arab?\u201d The Sunday Times, 25 April, 2004). Muslims in
\nSingapore are influenced by the religious events, doctrines and movements across the world.
\nMr Yaacob Ibrahim, Minister-in-charge of Muslim Affairs in Singapore pointed out that
\nWahhabism, an extreme teaching of Islam from Saudi Arabia \u201chas touched Indonesia and
\ninfluenced us here in Singapore\u201d (quoted in Millard, 2004b). He added that \u201cfeeling of
\nsympathy among local Muslims for Muslims in dire conditions elsewhere is to be expected\u201d
\n(Yaacob, 2006). Islamic religious teachers in Singapore noted that a minority of Muslims in
\nSingapore are sympathetic to extremist arguments forwarded by the Jemaah Islamiah (JI) \u2013
\nan extremist Islamic group in South-east Asia (Hussain, 2005). To this group of people, they
\nbelieve that the Singapore government is opposed to Islam, that Muslims in Singapore are
\noppressed, and that Muslims should not mix with non-Muslims. An Islamic religious teacher
\nin Singapore cautioned that this group of Muslims risk becoming militant and are likely to
\nsupport and become involved in terrorism (ibid.).
\nThe Islamic revivalism in Singapore reflects the intersection between national and
\nreligious identities and the tensions, complications and conflicts that could result from the
\n\u201cplural identity in the same individual\u201d (Breidlid & Nicolaisen, 1999, pp. 148-149, quoted in
\nChidester, 2000, p. 45). The tensions could result from the multiple duties and loyalties a
\nreligious believer faces as a citizen of a country. Complicating the issue is the fact many
\ncitizens have local and global ties and commitments beyond those to the nation-state
\n(Jackson, 2003). There is a potential conflict between the national loyalty of citizens and
\ntrans-national loyalty of religious believers. This is particularly relevant to the Muslims in
\nSingapore. A National Survey on Religion in 1989 reported that 95 per cent of Muslims view
\nreligion and religious education as important, the highest among the religious groups in
\nSingapore (\u201cReligion in Singapore: report of national survey\u201d, The Straits Times, 8 April,
\n1989, p. 20). A Gallup survey of 1000 households in 2000 showed that Malays identified
\nchiefly with religion, while Chinese identified primarily with ethnicity and neighbourhood
\n(Kadir and Horiuchi, 2003, quoted in Kadir, 2004). The potential conflict between national
\nand religious loyalties also blurs the distinction between public and private sphere. One
\nconsequence of Islamic revivalism is that Muslims may find it increasingly difficult to put
\nnational interests above the personal desire to take one\u2019s faith seriously \u2013 even if it means to
\nexpress one\u2019s religious views in the public arena. Chidester (2000) argues the traditional
\nmodels for managing religious diversity, which have been based on the distinction between
\nthe public and the private, have to be rejected. There is a need to locate the study of religion
\nwithin the constant process of struggle and negotiation over citizenship (Yuval-Davis, 1997;
\nChidester, 2003). The tensions arising from the potentially conflicting national and religious
\nidentities in citizens are evident in the case of Malay-Muslims in Singapore.<\/p>\n
The first challenge faced by Malay-Muslims is the threat of religious fundamentalism,
\nwhich was felt acutely in the arrests of Jemaah Islamiah (JI) terrorists in December 2001 and
\nAugust 2002 for attempting to commit violent attacks against western embassies and
\nSingapore key points (Tan, 2002; Desker, 2003). The former Senior Minister Mr. Lee Kuan
\nYew explained that it was peer pressure from the Middle East that convinced Singapore
\nMuslims to join the JI to fight for all oppressed Muslims worldwide (quoted in Hong, 2003,
\np. 5). To the small group of Muslims in Singapore, they are faced with the conflict between
\nthe national loyalty of citizens and the trans-national loyalty of religious believers. This
\ntension also has implications for inter-religious harmony in Singapore. The rise of religious
\nfundamentalism and the terrorist attacks by extremist Islamic group worldwide have
\ncontributed to inter-religious tensions between the Muslims and others in Singapore
\n(Gopinathan & Sharpe, 2004). Yaacob Ibrahim, Minister-in-charge of Muslims Affairs noted
\nthat \u201ccertain recent events may have affected trust and confidence levels between the various
\ncommunities\u201d (\u201cCode on religious harmony to be unveiled early next year\u201d, Channel News
\nAsia, 21 October 2002). The former Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong highlighted what he
\ncalled \u201cirrational fears\u201d among Muslims and non-Muslims in the wake of the arrests of 15
\nMuslim men for terrorism-related activities that are festering beneath the fa\u00e7ade of religious
\nharmony (Fernandez, 2002). Many Malay-Muslims in Singapore were consequently affected
\nby the public scrutiny, as pointed out by the MUIS President:
\nNot only did it [the Muslim community in Singapore] have to grapple with the
\nshocking revelation that some members of the community were involved in insidious
\nactivities that threatened society\u2019s peace and harmony, it also had to contend with
\nunrelenting public scrutiny over the tenability of Islamic practices in a modern,
\nsecular and multiethnic polity (Haji, 2002, p. 2, quoted by E. Tan, 2005)
\nSecondly, it is difficult to separate the public sphere from the private sphere for
\nMuslims in Singapore. In fact, more religious believers and groups are inclined to share their
\nreligious views on national matters in the public domain. A survey shows that six out of 10
\nwant the Government to consider religious beliefs when making policy (Low, 2005). This is
\nunsurprising since national policies and debates on issues such as stem-cell research, organ
\ndonation and casinos are intricately linked to moral and religious considerations. Religious
\nbelievers argue against the relegation of our deepest held convictions to the private sphere
\nand pretend that they have no bearing in the political arena (Chui, 2005). A good example is
\nthe year-long debate on whether Singapore should have a casino on the island. The debate
\nsaw many religious believers stating their religious convictions against the building of the
\ncasino, and statements from religious groups objecting to the casino. The anti-casino lobby
\nincluded MUIS which publicly aired its stand after seven Muslim organisations urged the
\ncouncil in a joint statement last month to convince the Government to refrain from
\nlegitimising the casino industry (Azhar, 2005). It is evident that the Muslims saw a greater
\nneed to assert their views in public.
\nThe third concern is the impact Islamic revivalism has on the relationship between
\nMuslims and non-Muslims in Singapore. While negative or inflammatory remarks about
\nanother religion could be made quietly in the past, modern technology \u2013 with blogging,
\nemailing, SMS-ing and internet chatting \u2013 has allowed information, news and rumours to
\nspread fast and wide. In the current climate of religious tensions between Muslims and nonMuslims, this individualistic expression of speech can potentially aggravate inter-religious
\ndistrust and conflicts. In such a climate of religious tension between the Muslims and nonMuslims, it is likely for misunderstanding to occur. A recent example is the case of three
\nChinese non-Muslim youths who were convicted in court for posting inflammatory remarks<\/p>\n
against Muslims. In the first case, two men (aged 27 and 25 years old) were jailed for
\nspewing vulgarities at the Muslim Malay community, comparing their religion to Satanism
\n(Chong, 2005). Apparently, their remarks were posted after a Muslim wrote to the press
\nasking if cab companies allow dogs to be transported in taxis. This question is important to
\nthe Muslims whose religion forbids them to come into contact with a dog\u2019s saliva. It is
\nreported that their remarks on the blogs sparked off more than 200 comments, some of which
\ninvolved the slinging of racial slurs at Chinese and Malays (\u201cOpinion on Net not an
\nunfettered right\u201d, The Straits Times, 8 October, 2005). Although they are young Singaporeans
\nwho have learnt about moral values in schools and claimed to have friends who subscribe to
\nthat religion (Nadarajan 2005), they remain so extreme and misguided in their views towards
\nthat religion. In the second case, a 17-year old boy was convicted for posting offensive
\ncomments about Malays and their religion on his blog, calling it \u201cThe Second Holocaust\u201d.
\nRather than sentencing him to jail, the judge ordered that he be sentenced to 180 hours of
\ncommunity work at Malay-Muslim welfare organisation under a Malay-Muslim probation
\nofficer who can \u201cact as a positive Malay role model\u201d for the youth. This sentence was
\nwelcomed by Muslim community leaders; a Muslim leader said: \u201cYou can give a jail
\nsentence but after the sentence, he may still not understand the other side of the story and the
\nculture\u201d (quoted in Chong, 2005<\/p>\n
Link : file:\/\/\/C:\/Users\/HP\/Downloads\/ECSJ-proof_Tan.pdf<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Singapore is a religiously diverse country. The 2000 national census reports that 85 per cent of the population in Singapore profess to belong to a religion, and a recent survey shows that almost 82 per cent of adolescents believe in some sort of deity (Chew, 2005). A majority of the population are Buddhists (42.5%), followed …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":4806,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[49],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-4817","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-religion"],"yoast_head":"\n