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Tel Aviv\u2019s unprecedented attack on a US-designated major non-NATO ally has warned the region that diplomatic ties and American bases offer no shield from Israeli military reach.<\/p>\n
On 9 September, Israel launched a\u00a0daylight attack on Qatar<\/a>, a US \u201cmajor non-NATO ally\u201d (MNNA). The stated pretext was the assassination of Hamas leaders, whom Tel Aviv itself had previously requested that long-time mediator, Doha, continue hosting in order to maintain Washington\u2019s indirect leverage over the movement.<\/p>\n But the strike served as a loud wake-up call to the entire region: There are no limits to Israel’s willingness to use military force, even against states that do not oppose it.<\/p>\n Why did Israel target Qatar?<\/strong><\/p>\n Israel\u2019s decision to strike Qatar was not taken lightly, given the high political cost. So what gains justified this move and led Tel Aviv to accept those consequences?<\/p>\n The primary goal was to reinforce the message that Hamas has \u201cno safe haven\u201d anywhere. As Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu\u00a0declared<\/a>\u00a0on 10 September, \u201cI say to Qatar and all nations who harbor terrorists, you either expel them or you bring them to justice. Because if you don\u2019t, we will.\u201d<\/p>\n While the operation failed to kill Hamas leaders, it marked a significant breach of what was long considered a red line: targeting Washington\u2019s allies in the Persian Gulf region.<\/p>\n This raises an important question: What guarantees that Israel will not expand these attacks to other countries such as Turkiye, Egypt, or others? The Qatar strike confirmed that neither US alignment nor geographic distance offers immunity in West Asia.<\/p>\n As Israel\u2019s ambassador to Washington, Yechiel Leiter,\u00a0told<\/a>\u00a0<\/i>Fox News, \u201cIf we didn\u2019t get them this time, we\u2019ll get them the next time.\u201d<\/p>\n In doing so, Tel Aviv aimed to intimidate other Hamas-friendly states and assert dominance over the escalation ladder\u00a0\u2013\u00a0even at the risk of alienating Abraham Accords signatories and complicating Washington\u2019s normalization drive.<\/p>\n The second goal is related to timing. The Israeli strike coincided with Hamas leaders reviewing a US-brokered ceasefire proposal for Gaza. Israel sought to achieve two things: first, to force Qatar to\u00a0withdraw<\/a>\u00a0from its mediator role by making it prohibitively costly; and second, to assassinate the chief negotiator himself, Khalil al-Hayya.<\/p>\n Such actions would derail diplomacy and open the door for Netanyahu to prolong the war until his core objective is achieved, which is to occupy Gaza and eliminate or expel all proponents of resistance\u00a0\u2013\u00a0effectively ending the armed struggle in the enclave.<\/p>\n The third goal was to demonstrate that Tel Aviv’s new security doctrine is no longer constrained by geography or politics. Although Israel has long had the region\u2019s strongest military, it previously sought to limit its engagements to countering immediate threats and restoring calm. Today, the aim is no longer containment but the total defeat of its enemies.<\/p>\n A\u00a0Foreign Affairs<\/i><\/a>\u00a0piece co-authored by Meir Ben-Shabbat\u00a0\u2013\u00a0head of the Misgav Institute for National Security and Zionist Strategy in Jerusalem, former Israeli national security advisor and National Security Council chief (2017\u20132021)\u00a0\u2013\u00a0and Asher Fredman, senior fellow at Misgav and former adviser to Israel\u2019s strategic affairs minister, lays it bare:<\/p>\n \u201cIsrael\u2019s\u00a0targeted killings<\/a>\u00a0of senior leaders in Iran, Lebanon, Qatar, and elsewhere show that Israel no longer adheres to redlines that its neighbors believed it would never cross. Israel will not grant immunity to any leaders of hostile groups, no matter their political title or location, if Israel believes they are involved in terrorist activity. In the past, Israel would generally have carried out these actions in a low-profile manner or tried to hide its role in them, but now its leaders openly embrace these moves.\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n Despite being the region\u2019s most powerful military force, \u201cIsrael is not a regional hegemon\u00a0\u2013\u00a0nor does it seek to be one.\u201d Instead, the article argues, Tel Aviv seeks to shape the regional order to a greater degree than ever before.<\/p>\n A fourth, though secondary, motive was to punish Qatar\u2019s media apparatus, particularly\u00a0Al Jazeera<\/i>, for its Gaza war coverage. The Qatari media has played a central role in amplifying the Palestinian narrative globally.<\/p>\n Since 2024, Israel has sought legal and operational tools to curb the channel: The Knesset passed a provisional \u201cforeign broadcasters<\/a>\u201d law allowing the prime minister and communications minister to shut down networks deemed security threats for 45-day renewable periods.<\/p>\n Netanyahu\u2019s office pledged immediate action against\u00a0Al Jazeera<\/i>; weeks later, the cabinet ordered the channel to cease Israeli platform broadcasts, seized its equipment, and shuttered its offices. Israeli courts upheld and extended the ban, while ministers portrayed the channel as endangering occupation forces, providing a security rationale for its repeated renewals.<\/p>\n The attack on Qatar also served as a blunt message to its media apparatus, which is that endorsement of Hamas\u2019s narrative now comes at a cost, and Doha must revise its media strategy.<\/p>\n Domestically, the strike sent a strong signal to Netanyahu\u2019s far-right coalition partners, who had repeatedly threatened to topple his government if he made concessions in hostage and ceasefire talks. By introducing a disruptive military operation into delicate negotiations, the likelihood of unacceptable compromises was nullified.<\/p>\n The discourse shifted from potential prisoner swaps to demands for \u201ctotal victory\u201d and debates about deterrence costs, not diplomatic trade-offs. When a\u00a0leader\u2019s survival<\/a>\u00a0depends on a narrow and hardline support base, displays of resolve, even at the expense of diplomacy, become politically expedient.<\/p>\n The strike thus served a potent internal function. It projected strength, forestalled concessions, and preserved the narrative of inevitable and absolute triumph. A\u00a0poll<\/a>\u00a0by\u00a0Maariv<\/i>\u00a0showed 75 percent of Israelis supported the attack\u00a0\u2013\u00a049 percent fully endorsed the operation and its timing, 26 percent approved but questioned its timing. Only 11 percent opposed the strike, while 14 percent declined to express an opinion.<\/p>\n International reactions and strategic implications<\/strong><\/p>\n Globally, Tel Aviv rushed to frame the attack as a blow to \u201cterrorist safe havens\u201d and a step toward recovering Israeli captives. The narrative holds that by eliminating Hamas\u2019s sanctuaries, pressure mounts on the group to accept any ceasefire deal\u00a0\u2013\u00a0regardless of terms.<\/p>\n While the strike undeniably increases pressure on Hamas, the real burden falls on the Gaza-based resistance, which has proven far more resilient than Tel Aviv anticipated.<\/p>\n The attack on Qatar immediately\u00a0triggered doubts<\/a>\u00a0over the utility of its security relationship with the US, which failed to prevent an assault on its own MNNA. Washington, eager to avoid fallout, quickly distanced itself from the Israeli move.<\/p>\n US President Donald Trump is said to have expressed deep displeasure with Israel, calling the operation a unilateral act contrary to US and Israeli interests. On 13 September, Trump met in New York with Qatari Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al-Thani, a step interpreted as damage control. White House spokeswoman Karoline Leavitt later stated Trump had\u00a0assured<\/a>\u00a0Qatari officials \u201cthat such a thing will not happen again on their soil.\u201d<\/p>\n Washington largely succeeded in mitigating fallout. Qatar\u2019s international media office issued a statement affirming that its security and defense partnership with the US is \u201cstronger than ever,\u201d denying reports that Doha was reassessing its military ties with Washington.<\/p>\n Still, the attack exposed critical questions for regional governments: What is the value of US bases if they cannot prevent aggression from Washington\u2019s top ally? What weight does the MNNA designation carry if Israel ignores it? If US air defenses will not protect Qatar, what will? And if Netanyahu acted without Trump\u2019s approval (reports state Washington was given\u00a0early notice<\/a>), how can Trump guarantee it will not happen again?<\/p>\n These are the urgent questions policy-makers across West Asia must ask. The sooner they reach answers, the better equipped they\u2019ll be to defend their sovereignty.<\/p>\n This was a major stress test for\u00a0US credibility<\/a>\u00a0in the Persian Gulf and for Qatar\u2019s trust in US protection, especially given the strategic importance of the\u00a0Al-Udeid base<\/a>. Yet Washington\u2019s public rebuke of Israel, rapid high-level engagement, and Doha\u2019s denial of any strategic reassessment suggest that damage was contained. Qatar, in fact, appears to be\u00a0doubling down<\/a>\u00a0on its military ties with the US, hoping this will deter future Israeli aggression.<\/p>\n Regionally, the strike sounded alarm bells in capitals like Ankara and Cairo, both of which fear they could be Tel Aviv\u2019s next target.\u00a0Egypt<\/a>\u00a0has already foiled an apparent Israeli plot to target Hamas leaders in the capital.<\/p>\n These concerns did not begin with the Qatar attack. They date back to Netanyahu\u2019s October 2023\u00a0threat<\/a>\u00a0to hunt down Hamas members wherever they may be:<\/p>\n \u201cAll Hamas terrorists are dead men walking \u2013 above ground, below ground, outside Gaza.\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n Israel\u2019s assault on Iran earlier this year only deepened fears. The\u00a012-day Israel<\/a>\u2013Iran war<\/a>\u00a0showed that deterrence in West Asia has collapsed and that Tel Aviv is ready to expand its military campaign to any country, even regional powers.<\/p>\n Ankara’s fears materialized swiftly. Turkish Defense Ministry spokesperson Admiral Zeki Akturk\u00a0warned<\/a>\u00a0that Israel could \u201cfurther expand its reckless attacks, as it did in Qatar, and drag the entire region, including its own country, into disaster.\u201d<\/p>\n Hamas leaders regularly travel to Turkiye, and some reside there. Tel Aviv has accused Ankara of allowing Hamas to plan attacks, conduct recruitment, and raise funds on Turkish soil.<\/p>\n \u201cIsrael\u2019s ability to conduct strikes with seeming impunity, often bypassing regional air defenses and international norms, sets a precedent that deeply worries Ankara,\u201d\u00a0said<\/a>\u00a0Serhat Suha Cubukcuoglu, director of Trends Research and Advisory\u2019s Turkiye program.<\/p>\n As for Egypt, multiple media outlets reported that Cairo warned the US of \u201csevere consequences\u201d if Israel attempted a Qatar-style strike on its territory. According to\u00a0Al Arabiya<\/i>\u00a0and other Saudi and Israeli media, Egypt has already reduced security coordination with Tel Aviv \u201cuntil further notice.\u201d<\/p>\n While these leaks reflect Cairo\u2019s anxiety, any serious retaliation against Tel Aviv or Washington remains unlikely. Egypt is more prone to leveraging these statements to deter Israeli escalation. Cairo may also attempt to expand its mediation role in the Gaza war, especially if Qatar\u2019s role wanes.<\/p>\n This would boost its influence over Hamas and raise its value in Washington\u2019s eyes. But this line of thinking misses one key point: Israel\u2019s ultimate objective is the eradication of all Palestinian resistance\u00a0\u2013\u00a0meaning Tel Aviv has no interest in any state mediating the war.<\/p>\n The Gulf summit and regional fallout<\/strong><\/p>\n