لنستخرج كنوزا من المعرفة و الإبداع و العلم و الأفكار
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is facing increased pressure to agree to a hostage and cease-fire deal, including from close allies like President Biden, Benny Gantz and Yoav Gallant. But key to any long-term cease-fire is the question of who will police the Gaza Strip the next day. In some ways, it is easier to imagine a “day after the day after.” It entails a reformed, legitimate Palestinian Authority that takes control of both the West Bank and Gaza and engages in serious negotiations for a two-state solution. But how to get there? How will the transition between a cease-fire and the establishment of a revitalized Palestinian Authority be managed in Gaza?
In the interim, Israel would prefer to remain in control, while Palestinians would prefer that they do. The second-best option for both sides — and therefore a potential compromise solution — is the proposed scenario of a peacekeeping force composed of Arab states, such as Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.
In recent weeks, Israeli officials have floated this idea, and Arab nations are reportedly warming to it, particularly if authorized by the United Nations. Biden last week confirmed negotiations with five Arab countries “to maintain security and peace” in Gaza during the transition to a reformed Palestinian Authority. An Arab force, moreover, is probably more palatable to the Palestinians than a Western one.
Egypt — given its proximity, cultural ties and history of having administered Gaza — would probably be a major contributor to, if not leader of, this force. Its military has knowledge of the terrain and its intelligence services have long-standing relationships in Gaza. Its political leaders have long viewed themselves as the lead actors in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Egypt fought five wars with Israel before becoming the first to make peace and, in recent years, has actively tried to mediate between Hamas and Fatah. Moreover, Egypt today has greater need for the influx of foreign financial support that would come with such a role in Gaza. As a result, Egypt is one of the strongest backers of this proposal, with Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry saying Egypt would be “willing to play our role fully,” subject to “risk and reward.”
Those risks, however, are considerable. Egypt faces major internal constraints that, if unresolved, make such a plan unfeasible. Perhaps the most salient is Hamas’s popularity within Egypt, which jumped to 75 percent after Oct. 7, up from 23 percent in 2020. In response, Egypt’s regime has been working in overdrive to portray itself as sufficiently pro-Palestinian, with state-sponsored media outlets justifying the decision not to take in more Palestinian refugees as actually being in alignment with the Palestinian cause. The military also recently sponsored a Ramadan drama series called “Maliha” to prove its staunch support for Palestinians.
In this context, Egypt is unlikely to risk joining a peacekeeping force if Hamas has not agreed to it. Thus far, Hamas has threatened to “fight against any force … from any nationality in the Gaza Strip.” If Egyptian soldiers would have to clash with Hamas, it might taint the military’s reputation at home, something it cares deeply about. It might even threaten the military’s cohesion, a risk the brass would never take. And it might spark protests at home, which would be all the more dangerous for the regime if part of the security apparatus is out of the country.
But how can Egypt ever get Hamas’s buy-in for an arrangement that effectively sidelines it? Three elements seem important. The first is to spell out in detail what the transition would look like. That means announcing a firm end date to the peacekeepers’ mandate, a clear process by which the Palestinian Authority would be reformed, and most important, a guarantee that Hamas as a political party — though not as an armed group — would have a chance to become part of that new Palestinian state. A critical mass within Hamas would have to see a future for themselves in this plan or they would resist, deterring Egypt (and in turn, other Arab states) from taking part.
Second, the peacekeeping force would need to enjoy full autonomy from both Hamas and Israel. Egypt’s government will not risk its credibility with the Palestinian and Egyptian peoples if Israel plans to transform Gaza into another West Bank. If Israel, for instance, reserves the right to perform ground incursions into Gaza whenever it senses a security threat, it would undermine the Arab force’s authority, causing it to be perceived as Israel’s facilitator, with consequent risks for destabilization. Likewise, if Hamas rearms and launches rocket attacks into Israel, it risks the Arab force being painted as Hamas’s facilitator, inviting Israeli retaliation. The Arab force must retain the image of the guarantor of security for both sides. The Israelis and the Palestinians must pledge to respect its role and avoid any escalations that might jeopardize an already tense situation.
Finally, Egypt would need to build trust with Hamas to help weather the inevitable frictions that would emerge during the transition. This is especially the case for President Abdel Fatah El-Sisi , whose coup against the Muslim Brotherhood in 2013 and subsequent crackdown on tunnels into Gaza was a bitter pill for Hamas to swallow (and helped push it toward Iran). An important trust-building measure could be for Egypt to engage in political reform — by releasing political prisoners and ensuring the safe return of the scores of politicians in exile. Given that a significant proportion of these are members of the Muslim Brotherhood, such reforms might grease the wheels of trust between Egypt and Hamas. Moreover, such liberalization would give Egypt’s opposition reason to work within the system rather than revolt against it, reducing the danger of instability at home. The recent court decision to remove 1,530 people from the terrorist list might be a step in this direction.
These are difficult asks for all parties involved. But without compromise and trust, this plan cannot work. Israel, Hamas and Egypt could all play spoiler if they so choose. The scale of the potential devastation in Rafah if such a deal is not reached makes it all the more important to be flexible and creative in envisioning the day after.
