38 The Rise of Political Islam in Turkey
of the new ruling elite.13 Reinterpreting the nation and state as a family
and community, these scholars selectively used Ottoman-Islamic ideas
to make the past relevant to the present and to cement differing inter-
ests together by emphasizing the danger to family, nation, and state
posed by ideological fragmentation. The educational system and the
media were then used to disseminate a popularized version of the ide-
ology to the masses.
The architects of this ideological program hoped to create a new
form of depoliticized Turkish-Islamic culture that would reunify soci-
ety and provide the basis for a unified, strong, and stable state. The syn-
thesis, however, sent an ambiguous message. On one hand, under the
1982 constitution, Turkey was defined as a secular state. On the other
hand, the role of religion was strengthened in schools and education as
a means of reinforcing Turkish nationalism, which tended to weaken
the emphasis on secularism. At the same time, it provided opportuni-
ties for the Islamists to expand and reinforce their own message.
The Impact of the Özal Reforms
The economic and political reforms carried out under Prime Minister
Turgut Özal in the mid-1980s also contributed to strengthening the
role of Islamic groups. The reforms weakened the state’s control over
the economy and created a new class of entrepreneurs and capitalists
in the provincial towns of Anatolia, including Denizli, Gaziantep, and
Kahramanmaraú. The economic upswing created a new middle class—
the so-called “Anatolian bourgeoisie”—with strong roots in Islamic
culture. This group favors liberal economic policies and a reduction of
the role of the state in the economic and social spheres. It also supports
13 Hakan Yavuz, “Political Islam and the Welfare (Refah) Party in Turkey,” Comparative
Politics, Vol. 10, No. 1, October 1997, p. 68; for the Ottoman and republican origins of the
“Turkish-Islamic synthesis,” see Gökhan Çetinsaya, “Rethinking Nationalism and Islam:
Some Preliminary Notes on the Roots of ‘Turkish-Islamic Synthesis’ in Modern Turkish
Political Thought,” The Muslim World, Vol. 89, Issue 3-4, October 1999, pp. 350–376,
at http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1478-1913.1999.tb02753.x (as of
March 21, 2008).
of the new ruling elite.13 Reinterpreting the nation and state as a family
and community, these scholars selectively used Ottoman-Islamic ideas
to make the past relevant to the present and to cement differing inter-
ests together by emphasizing the danger to family, nation, and state
posed by ideological fragmentation. The educational system and the
media were then used to disseminate a popularized version of the ide-
ology to the masses.
The architects of this ideological program hoped to create a new
form of depoliticized Turkish-Islamic culture that would reunify soci-
ety and provide the basis for a unified, strong, and stable state. The syn-
thesis, however, sent an ambiguous message. On one hand, under the
1982 constitution, Turkey was defined as a secular state. On the other
hand, the role of religion was strengthened in schools and education as
a means of reinforcing Turkish nationalism, which tended to weaken
the emphasis on secularism. At the same time, it provided opportuni-
ties for the Islamists to expand and reinforce their own message.
The Impact of the Özal Reforms
The economic and political reforms carried out under Prime Minister
Turgut Özal in the mid-1980s also contributed to strengthening the
role of Islamic groups. The reforms weakened the state’s control over
the economy and created a new class of entrepreneurs and capitalists
in the provincial towns of Anatolia, including Denizli, Gaziantep, and
Kahramanmaraú. The economic upswing created a new middle class—
the so-called “Anatolian bourgeoisie”—with strong roots in Islamic
culture. This group favors liberal economic policies and a reduction of
the role of the state in the economic and social spheres. It also supports
13 Hakan Yavuz, “Political Islam and the Welfare (Refah) Party in Turkey,” Comparative
Politics, Vol. 10, No. 1, October 1997, p. 68; for the Ottoman and republican origins of the
“Turkish-Islamic synthesis,” see Gökhan Çetinsaya, “Rethinking Nationalism and Islam:
Some Preliminary Notes on the Roots of ‘Turkish-Islamic Synthesis’ in Modern Turkish
Political Thought,” The Muslim World, Vol. 89, Issue 3-4, October 1999, pp. 350–376,
at http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1478-1913.1999.tb02753.x (as of
March 21, 2008).
The Rise of Political Islam in Turkey 39
greater religious freedom. In the 1990s, it supported the Welfare Party.
Today, it is one of the core constituencies backing the AKP.
Özal’s reforms also resulted in an inflow of capital, much of it
from the Arab world. This allowed the Islamists to organize politically.
Under Özal’s more tolerant approach to religion, Muslim groups and
brotherhoods were given greater freedoms and were allowed to finance
the construction of private schools and universities. The reforms also
opened up greater political space for new political groups—including
the Islamists. Islamist groups gained access to important media outlets
and newspaper chains, which allowed them to reach a much broader
political audience.14 Television, in particular, provided an important
means of propagating their message.15
Demographic changes also had an impact. The industrial and
modernization policies pursued by successive Turkish governments led
to a large-scale influx of the rural population into the cities. These
rural migrants brought with them their traditional habits, beliefs, and
customs. Uprooted and alienated, many lived in makeshift shanty-
towns (gecekondu mahallesi) on the outskirts of large cities and were
not integrated into urban culture. They represented an important pool
of potential voters for Islamic parties opposed to Westernization and
the forces of globalization, such as the series of Erbakan’s Milli Görüş
parties (see below). At the same time, the large influx of migrants con-
tributed to an internal “clash of civilizations.” The two Turkeys—one
secular and urban, the other rural and pious—were brought into closer
proximity with one another, exacerbating social tensions.
In many ways, Özal embodied these clashing traditions. A
Western-trained technocrat who had worked for the World Bank, he
was also a supporter of the Nakúibendi order and had been associated
with Erbakan’s National Salvation Party before founding the Mother-
land Party (Anavatan Partisi (ANAP)) in 1983. He thus bridged the
14 ùerif Mardin has pointed to the important role played by the expansion of the media in
propagating the “Islamic voice” and contributing to the rise of Islamic political parties. See
Mardin, “Turkish Islamic Exceptionalism Yesterday and Today,” p. 157.
15 Until 1989, Turkey had only one television channel, the state-run TRT. The first religiously
oriented channels began to emerge in 1993 and were linked to the Gülen movement.
greater religious freedom. In the 1990s, it supported the Welfare Party.
Today, it is one of the core constituencies backing the AKP.
Özal’s reforms also resulted in an inflow of capital, much of it
from the Arab world. This allowed the Islamists to organize politically.
Under Özal’s more tolerant approach to religion, Muslim groups and
brotherhoods were given greater freedoms and were allowed to finance
the construction of private schools and universities. The reforms also
opened up greater political space for new political groups—including
the Islamists. Islamist groups gained access to important media outlets
and newspaper chains, which allowed them to reach a much broader
political audience.14 Television, in particular, provided an important
means of propagating their message.15
Demographic changes also had an impact. The industrial and
modernization policies pursued by successive Turkish governments led
to a large-scale influx of the rural population into the cities. These
rural migrants brought with them their traditional habits, beliefs, and
customs. Uprooted and alienated, many lived in makeshift shanty-
towns (gecekondu mahallesi) on the outskirts of large cities and were
not integrated into urban culture. They represented an important pool
of potential voters for Islamic parties opposed to Westernization and
the forces of globalization, such as the series of Erbakan’s Milli Görüş
parties (see below). At the same time, the large influx of migrants con-
tributed to an internal “clash of civilizations.” The two Turkeys—one
secular and urban, the other rural and pious—were brought into closer
proximity with one another, exacerbating social tensions.
In many ways, Özal embodied these clashing traditions. A
Western-trained technocrat who had worked for the World Bank, he
was also a supporter of the Nakúibendi order and had been associated
with Erbakan’s National Salvation Party before founding the Mother-
land Party (Anavatan Partisi (ANAP)) in 1983. He thus bridged the
14 ùerif Mardin has pointed to the important role played by the expansion of the media in
propagating the “Islamic voice” and contributing to the rise of Islamic political parties. See
Mardin, “Turkish Islamic Exceptionalism Yesterday and Today,” p. 157.
15 Until 1989, Turkey had only one television channel, the state-run TRT. The first religiously
oriented channels began to emerge in 1993 and were linked to the Gülen movement.
40 The Rise of Political Islam in Turkey
secular-Islamic divide. As Henri Barkey noted, “He was as comfortable
with Western leaders as in a mosque.”16
The Rise of the Religious Right
These economic and social changes contributed to an upsurge in the
political strength of Islamic political groups in the 1970s and 1980s.
Its first independent political expression was the establishment of the
National Order Party (MNP) in January 1970. The MNP was the first
of several Islamic parties led by Necmettin Erbakan. It advocated a
new economic and social order based on “national” (read Islamic) prin-
ciples. However, the MNP’s existence was short-lived. The party was
shut down after a military intervention in 1971 on the grounds that it
was against the secular nature of the state.
The founders of the MNP and its successors came out of the
National View (Milli Görüş) movement,17 whose leaders sought a return
to traditional values and institutions. They regarded the Kemalist
attempt to replace the Islamic-Ottoman state and culture with a West-
ern model as a historic mistake and the source of all the ills in Turkish
society. Their goal was to build a “national (Islamic) order” and put
an end to the process of Westernization.18 They saw Turkey’s identity
and future closely linked with the Muslim world, rather than with the
West.
The National Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Partisi (MSP)) was
founded in October 1972. Like the MNP, which was closed in May
1971, the MSP fused Islam and Turkish nationalism. The MSP’s slogan
was “A Great Turkey Once Again” (“Yeniden Büyük Türkiye”). The par-
ty’s proposed solution to Turkey’s problems was to return to Islam’s
16 Barkey, “The Struggles of a ‘Strong’ State,” p. 99.
17 For background on the Milli Görüş movement and its philosophy, see Fulya Atacan,
“Explaining Religious Politics at the Crossroad: AKP-SP,” Turkish Studies, Vol. 6, No. 2,
June 2005, pp. 187–199.
18 See Ihsan D. Da÷i, “Transformation of Islamic Political Identity in Turkey: Rethinking
the West and Westernization,” Turkish Studies, Vol. 6, No. 1, March 2005, pp. 21–37.
secular-Islamic divide. As Henri Barkey noted, “He was as comfortable
with Western leaders as in a mosque.”16
The Rise of the Religious Right
These economic and social changes contributed to an upsurge in the
political strength of Islamic political groups in the 1970s and 1980s.
Its first independent political expression was the establishment of the
National Order Party (MNP) in January 1970. The MNP was the first
of several Islamic parties led by Necmettin Erbakan. It advocated a
new economic and social order based on “national” (read Islamic) prin-
ciples. However, the MNP’s existence was short-lived. The party was
shut down after a military intervention in 1971 on the grounds that it
was against the secular nature of the state.
The founders of the MNP and its successors came out of the
National View (Milli Görüş) movement,17 whose leaders sought a return
to traditional values and institutions. They regarded the Kemalist
attempt to replace the Islamic-Ottoman state and culture with a West-
ern model as a historic mistake and the source of all the ills in Turkish
society. Their goal was to build a “national (Islamic) order” and put
an end to the process of Westernization.18 They saw Turkey’s identity
and future closely linked with the Muslim world, rather than with the
West.
The National Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Partisi (MSP)) was
founded in October 1972. Like the MNP, which was closed in May
1971, the MSP fused Islam and Turkish nationalism. The MSP’s slogan
was “A Great Turkey Once Again” (“Yeniden Büyük Türkiye”). The par-
ty’s proposed solution to Turkey’s problems was to return to Islam’s
16 Barkey, “The Struggles of a ‘Strong’ State,” p. 99.
17 For background on the Milli Görüş movement and its philosophy, see Fulya Atacan,
“Explaining Religious Politics at the Crossroad: AKP-SP,” Turkish Studies, Vol. 6, No. 2,
June 2005, pp. 187–199.
18 See Ihsan D. Da÷i, “Transformation of Islamic Political Identity in Turkey: Rethinking
the West and Westernization,” Turkish Studies, Vol. 6, No. 1, March 2005, pp. 21–37.
The Rise of Political Islam in Turkey 41
teachings and a “Muslim way of life.” The MNP declared that the pro-
cess of Westernization had fragmented Turkish society and led to a loss
of grandeur and that a policy of industrialization, based on “native”
heavy industry created by Anatolian capital, would create a strong
nation that would turn its back on the West and become the leader
of the Muslim world. In place of ties to the West, the MSP favored
the creation of a Muslim Common Market, with the Islamic dinar
as its common currency, and the development of a Muslim Defense
Alliance.19
The MSP was a coalition of different Islamic and conservative
groups. While the party’s leader, Necmettin Erbakan, maintained tight
political control, there were conflicts from the outset among the differ-
ent groups and religious orders over the party’s political orientation, as
well as over Erbakan’s authoritarian leadership style. 20 These political
and ideological divisions became more pronounced after Erbakan’s ill-
fated tenure as prime minister (1996–1997) and eventually resulted in
the split in the movement in 2001 that gave rise to the AKP.
In the 1970s, the MSP established itself as an important actor in
Turkish political life. It gained third place in the 1973 election, with 12
percent of the vote and 11 percent of the seats in parliament. Erbakan
formed a coalition government with the CHP, becoming deputy prime
minister under Bülent Ecevit. After the coalition collapsed, the MSP
joined the National Front governments headed by Süleyman Demirel
in 1975 and 1977.
After the military coup in 1980, the MSP was closed down, and
Erbakan and his lieutenants were banned from political activities for
ten years. However, the party reemerged in 1983 under a new name—
the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi (RP)). Welfare’s ideology differed little
from that of the MSP. It expressed the same hostility to Westernization
19 On the MSP’s program and ideology, see Jacob Landau, “The National Salvation Party in
Turkey,” Asian and African Studies, Vol. 11, 1976, pp. 1–57. Also Binnaz Toprak, “Politiciza-
tion of Islam in a Secular State,” in Said Arjomand (ed.), From Nationalism to Revolutionary
Islam, London: Macmillan, 1984, pp. 119–133, and Binnaz Toprak, “Islam and Democracy
in Turkey,” Turkish Studies, Vol. 6, No. 2, June 2005, pp. 187–199.
20 For a detailed discussion of the political and ideological struggles within the MSP, see
Atacan, “Explaining Religious Politics at the Crossroad: AKP-SP,” pp. 187–199.
teachings and a “Muslim way of life.” The MNP declared that the pro-
cess of Westernization had fragmented Turkish society and led to a loss
of grandeur and that a policy of industrialization, based on “native”
heavy industry created by Anatolian capital, would create a strong
nation that would turn its back on the West and become the leader
of the Muslim world. In place of ties to the West, the MSP favored
the creation of a Muslim Common Market, with the Islamic dinar
as its common currency, and the development of a Muslim Defense
Alliance.19
The MSP was a coalition of different Islamic and conservative
groups. While the party’s leader, Necmettin Erbakan, maintained tight
political control, there were conflicts from the outset among the differ-
ent groups and religious orders over the party’s political orientation, as
well as over Erbakan’s authoritarian leadership style. 20 These political
and ideological divisions became more pronounced after Erbakan’s ill-
fated tenure as prime minister (1996–1997) and eventually resulted in
the split in the movement in 2001 that gave rise to the AKP.
In the 1970s, the MSP established itself as an important actor in
Turkish political life. It gained third place in the 1973 election, with 12
percent of the vote and 11 percent of the seats in parliament. Erbakan
formed a coalition government with the CHP, becoming deputy prime
minister under Bülent Ecevit. After the coalition collapsed, the MSP
joined the National Front governments headed by Süleyman Demirel
in 1975 and 1977.
After the military coup in 1980, the MSP was closed down, and
Erbakan and his lieutenants were banned from political activities for
ten years. However, the party reemerged in 1983 under a new name—
the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi (RP)). Welfare’s ideology differed little
from that of the MSP. It expressed the same hostility to Westernization
19 On the MSP’s program and ideology, see Jacob Landau, “The National Salvation Party in
Turkey,” Asian and African Studies, Vol. 11, 1976, pp. 1–57. Also Binnaz Toprak, “Politiciza-
tion of Islam in a Secular State,” in Said Arjomand (ed.), From Nationalism to Revolutionary
Islam, London: Macmillan, 1984, pp. 119–133, and Binnaz Toprak, “Islam and Democracy
in Turkey,” Turkish Studies, Vol. 6, No. 2, June 2005, pp. 187–199.
20 For a detailed discussion of the political and ideological struggles within the MSP, see
Atacan, “Explaining Religious Politics at the Crossroad: AKP-SP,” pp. 187–199.
42 The Rise of Political Islam in Turkey
and the same anti-Western bias. Its economic program, “Just Order,”
stressed the need for greater social justice and equality and an end to
undue Western influence. In foreign policy, Welfare advocated cut-
ting Turkey’s ties to the West and closer integration with the Muslim
world.
In the 1987 elections, Welfare received 7.16 percent of the vote—
short of the 10 percent needed for representation in parliament. As
a result, the religious right was not represented as a separate party
in parliament during the 1980s. Many of Welfare’s adherents joined
Özal’s Motherland Party (ANAP), which brought together religious
and bureaucratic secular conservatives under one roof, siphoning off
support from the religious right that otherwise would have gone to
Welfare.
Political Islam in Power: The Welfare Interlude
Political Islam witnessed a strong resurgence in the early 1990s. In the
March 1994 local elections, the Welfare Party received 19 percent of
the vote and won the mayor’s office in 28 municipalities, including
Turkey’s two largest cities, Istanbul and Ankara. In the 1995 national
elections, Welfare came in first with 21.6 percent of the vote and
formed a coalition with the right-of-center True Path Party (the succes-
sor to Demirel’s Justice Party), with Erbakan as prime minister. Wel-
fare’s stunning victory sent shock waves throughout the secular estab-
lishment, especially the military. For the first time since the founding
of the Turkish Republic in 1923, Turkey was run by an Islamist party,
with an Islamist prime minister.
Several factors contributed to Welfare’s strong showing. Perhaps
most important was a shift in Welfare’s political agenda, which put
stronger emphasis on social issues rather than religious themes. 21 This
allowed Welfare to broaden its appeal beyond the hard-core religious
right. At the same time, Welfare’s populist but catchy Just Order pro-
21 Da÷i, “Transformation of Islamic Political Identity,” p. 25.
and the same anti-Western bias. Its economic program, “Just Order,”
stressed the need for greater social justice and equality and an end to
undue Western influence. In foreign policy, Welfare advocated cut-
ting Turkey’s ties to the West and closer integration with the Muslim
world.
In the 1987 elections, Welfare received 7.16 percent of the vote—
short of the 10 percent needed for representation in parliament. As
a result, the religious right was not represented as a separate party
in parliament during the 1980s. Many of Welfare’s adherents joined
Özal’s Motherland Party (ANAP), which brought together religious
and bureaucratic secular conservatives under one roof, siphoning off
support from the religious right that otherwise would have gone to
Welfare.
Political Islam in Power: The Welfare Interlude
Political Islam witnessed a strong resurgence in the early 1990s. In the
March 1994 local elections, the Welfare Party received 19 percent of
the vote and won the mayor’s office in 28 municipalities, including
Turkey’s two largest cities, Istanbul and Ankara. In the 1995 national
elections, Welfare came in first with 21.6 percent of the vote and
formed a coalition with the right-of-center True Path Party (the succes-
sor to Demirel’s Justice Party), with Erbakan as prime minister. Wel-
fare’s stunning victory sent shock waves throughout the secular estab-
lishment, especially the military. For the first time since the founding
of the Turkish Republic in 1923, Turkey was run by an Islamist party,
with an Islamist prime minister.
Several factors contributed to Welfare’s strong showing. Perhaps
most important was a shift in Welfare’s political agenda, which put
stronger emphasis on social issues rather than religious themes. 21 This
allowed Welfare to broaden its appeal beyond the hard-core religious
right. At the same time, Welfare’s populist but catchy Just Order pro-
21 Da÷i, “Transformation of Islamic Political Identity,” p. 25.
The Rise of Political Islam in Turkey 43
gram allowed it to gain important support among the urban poor who
traditionally had voted for the CHP.
Welfare was the best organized of all the political parties, with a
legion of devout Muslims, especially women, who did volunteer work
for the party and provided a network of social-welfare help to the poor.
The party’s grassroots network was extremely effective, working in the
gecekondu and other poor urban areas, helping residents to find jobs,
providing hospital and health care, distributing free food, and provid-
ing other social amenities. 22
Welfare also benefited from a strong anti-Western backlash gen-
erated by the EU’s rejection of Turkey’s membership application at its
December 1989 summit, which was seen by many Turks as motivated
by cultural and religious biases, as well as by the West’s failure to stop
the killing of Muslims in Bosnia. The increasing disappointment with
the West gave resonance to Welfare’s strong anti-Western rhetoric.
However, once in office, Welfare showed little capacity for
addressing Turkey’s mounting domestic problems. Erbakan found it
difficult to balance his anti-system campaign rhetoric with the need to
consider the interests of the secular establishment, which was highly
suspicious of his political goals, as well as of his commitment to democ-
racy. Instead of pursuing policies designed to reduce social tensions,
Erbakan further polarized Turkish society along secular-Islamic lines.
He angered hard-core Islamist supporters by accepting a customs union
with the EU and continuing to honor treaties with Israel that he had
promised to annul. At the same time, he inflamed the secular establish-
ment by saying that rectors of universities would have to kiss the hands
of female students wearing headscarves (the wearing of headscarves was
forbidden in universities) and threatening to build a mosque in Taksim
Square, a major public transportation hub in the heart of Istanbul. 23
22 On Welfare’s grassroots organization, see in particular Jenny B. White, Islamic Mobiliza-
tion in Turkey: A Study in Vernacular Politics, Seattle and London: University of Washing-
ton Press, 2002. Also Yavuz, “Political Islam and the Welfare (Refah) Party in Turkey,” pp.
71–73, and Toprak, “Islam and Democracy in Turkey,” p. 181.
23 The first Erdo÷an-led municipal government of Istanbul tried to revive the Taksim Square
mosque project, as well as another mosque project on the European side, in Göztepe Park.
Both projects were shelved because of public opposition.
gram allowed it to gain important support among the urban poor who
traditionally had voted for the CHP.
Welfare was the best organized of all the political parties, with a
legion of devout Muslims, especially women, who did volunteer work
for the party and provided a network of social-welfare help to the poor.
The party’s grassroots network was extremely effective, working in the
gecekondu and other poor urban areas, helping residents to find jobs,
providing hospital and health care, distributing free food, and provid-
ing other social amenities. 22
Welfare also benefited from a strong anti-Western backlash gen-
erated by the EU’s rejection of Turkey’s membership application at its
December 1989 summit, which was seen by many Turks as motivated
by cultural and religious biases, as well as by the West’s failure to stop
the killing of Muslims in Bosnia. The increasing disappointment with
the West gave resonance to Welfare’s strong anti-Western rhetoric.
However, once in office, Welfare showed little capacity for
addressing Turkey’s mounting domestic problems. Erbakan found it
difficult to balance his anti-system campaign rhetoric with the need to
consider the interests of the secular establishment, which was highly
suspicious of his political goals, as well as of his commitment to democ-
racy. Instead of pursuing policies designed to reduce social tensions,
Erbakan further polarized Turkish society along secular-Islamic lines.
He angered hard-core Islamist supporters by accepting a customs union
with the EU and continuing to honor treaties with Israel that he had
promised to annul. At the same time, he inflamed the secular establish-
ment by saying that rectors of universities would have to kiss the hands
of female students wearing headscarves (the wearing of headscarves was
forbidden in universities) and threatening to build a mosque in Taksim
Square, a major public transportation hub in the heart of Istanbul. 23
22 On Welfare’s grassroots organization, see in particular Jenny B. White, Islamic Mobiliza-
tion in Turkey: A Study in Vernacular Politics, Seattle and London: University of Washing-
ton Press, 2002. Also Yavuz, “Political Islam and the Welfare (Refah) Party in Turkey,” pp.
71–73, and Toprak, “Islam and Democracy in Turkey,” p. 181.
23 The first Erdo÷an-led municipal government of Istanbul tried to revive the Taksim Square
mosque project, as well as another mosque project on the European side, in Göztepe Park.
Both projects were shelved because of public opposition.
44 The Rise of Political Islam in Turkey
Moreover, in his first months in office, Erbakan undertook a number
of foreign-policy initiatives—including an ill-fated trip to Libya and
the promotion of an Islamic economic grouping (the D-8) as an alter-
native to the EU—that indicated that he intended to push an Islamist
foreign policy.
These moves, together with Erbakan’s often intemperate rhetoric,
alarmed the secular establishment, particularly the military. However,
rather than intervening directly, as it had in 1960, 1971, and 1980,
the military used more-subtle and indirect methods to force Erbakan’s
ouster. On February 28, 1997, the National Security Council—which
was dominated by the military—presented Erbakan with a list of rec-
ommendations to curb anti-secular activity. 24 When Erbakan balked at
implementing the recommendations, the military held a series of brief-
ings and mobilized the secular establishment against him, eventually
forcing him to resign in June 1997 in what has been termed a “silent”
or “post-modern” coup. In January 1998, the Welfare Party was closed
down, and Erbakan and his key lieutenants were banned from politics
for five years.
The Impact of the February 28 Process
The “February 28 process,” as the military’s effort to force Erbakan’s
resignation is termed in Turkey, was an important political watershed.
It marked the abandonment of the idea that religion could be used to
consolidate society, which had been at the root of the Turkish-Islamic
synthesis. Thereafter, the military embarked on an overt campaign
against Islamist ideas and ideology, which together with Kurdish sepa-
ratism was singled out as one of the main threats to Turkish security.
At the same time, the February 28 process had an important
impact on the orientation and development of the Islamist movement.
It underscored the fact that a direct, head-on attempt to push an overt
24 For the text of the military’s February 28 recommendations in English and an analysis of
the February 28 process and its aftermath, see Niyazi Gunay, “Implementing the ‘February
28’ Recommendations: A Scorecard,” Research Notes No. 10, Washington Institute for Near
East Policy, May 2001.
Moreover, in his first months in office, Erbakan undertook a number
of foreign-policy initiatives—including an ill-fated trip to Libya and
the promotion of an Islamic economic grouping (the D-8) as an alter-
native to the EU—that indicated that he intended to push an Islamist
foreign policy.
These moves, together with Erbakan’s often intemperate rhetoric,
alarmed the secular establishment, particularly the military. However,
rather than intervening directly, as it had in 1960, 1971, and 1980,
the military used more-subtle and indirect methods to force Erbakan’s
ouster. On February 28, 1997, the National Security Council—which
was dominated by the military—presented Erbakan with a list of rec-
ommendations to curb anti-secular activity. 24 When Erbakan balked at
implementing the recommendations, the military held a series of brief-
ings and mobilized the secular establishment against him, eventually
forcing him to resign in June 1997 in what has been termed a “silent”
or “post-modern” coup. In January 1998, the Welfare Party was closed
down, and Erbakan and his key lieutenants were banned from politics
for five years.
The Impact of the February 28 Process
The “February 28 process,” as the military’s effort to force Erbakan’s
resignation is termed in Turkey, was an important political watershed.
It marked the abandonment of the idea that religion could be used to
consolidate society, which had been at the root of the Turkish-Islamic
synthesis. Thereafter, the military embarked on an overt campaign
against Islamist ideas and ideology, which together with Kurdish sepa-
ratism was singled out as one of the main threats to Turkish security.
At the same time, the February 28 process had an important
impact on the orientation and development of the Islamist movement.
It underscored the fact that a direct, head-on attempt to push an overt
24 For the text of the military’s February 28 recommendations in English and an analysis of
the February 28 process and its aftermath, see Niyazi Gunay, “Implementing the ‘February
28’ Recommendations: A Scorecard,” Research Notes No. 10, Washington Institute for Near
East Policy, May 2001.
The Rise of Political Islam in Turkey 45
Islamic agenda could not succeed and would generate strong opposi-
tion from the secularists, especially the military. Many members of the
Islamist movement concluded that the only way the Islamists could
succeed was by avoiding a direct confrontation with the secularists and
deemphasizing the religious agenda.
This recognition sparked an intense internal debate and rethink-
ing within the Islamic movement about the movement’s future politi-
cal strategy and agenda, and a growing philosophical and political rift
emerged within the movement between two different groups. The “tra-
ditionalists” (Gelenekçiler), centered on Erbakan and his chief lieuten-
ant, Recai Kutan, opposed any serious change in approach or policy,
while a younger group of “modernists,” or “reformists” (Yenilikçiler), led
by Recep Tayyip Erdo÷an, the mayor of Istanbul, and his close associ-
ate Abdullah Gül, argued that the party needed to rethink its approach
to a number of fundamental issues, particularly democracy, human
rights, and relations with the West. The reformists also opposed Erba-
kan’s authoritarian leadership style and called for greater inner-party
democracy.
The influence of this internal debate was reflected in the platform
of the Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi (FP)), which replaced the Welfare
Party. However, while Virtue was Welfare’s successor, it differed in a
number of important respects. Unlike Welfare, which was ideologi-
cally hostile to the West and Westernization, Virtue began to embrace
Western political values. In short, anti-Westernism and suspicion of the
West were no longer a hallmark of Islamist discourse. 25 A timeline of
the religious-right parties is shown in Figure 3.1.
After the Virtue Party was shut down by the Constitutional Court
in June 2001, the movement formally split. The traditionalists estab-
lished the Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi (SP)), under the formal leader-
ship of Recai Kutan, with Erbakan exerting the real leadership behind
the scenes. The modernists founded a new party, the AKP, with Erdogan as party chairman,this split represented a fundamental ideological
rift in the Milli Görüş movement.
Islamic agenda could not succeed and would generate strong opposi-
tion from the secularists, especially the military. Many members of the
Islamist movement concluded that the only way the Islamists could
succeed was by avoiding a direct confrontation with the secularists and
deemphasizing the religious agenda.
This recognition sparked an intense internal debate and rethink-
ing within the Islamic movement about the movement’s future politi-
cal strategy and agenda, and a growing philosophical and political rift
emerged within the movement between two different groups. The “tra-
ditionalists” (Gelenekçiler), centered on Erbakan and his chief lieuten-
ant, Recai Kutan, opposed any serious change in approach or policy,
while a younger group of “modernists,” or “reformists” (Yenilikçiler), led
by Recep Tayyip Erdo÷an, the mayor of Istanbul, and his close associ-
ate Abdullah Gül, argued that the party needed to rethink its approach
to a number of fundamental issues, particularly democracy, human
rights, and relations with the West. The reformists also opposed Erba-
kan’s authoritarian leadership style and called for greater inner-party
democracy.
The influence of this internal debate was reflected in the platform
of the Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi (FP)), which replaced the Welfare
Party. However, while Virtue was Welfare’s successor, it differed in a
number of important respects. Unlike Welfare, which was ideologi-
cally hostile to the West and Westernization, Virtue began to embrace
Western political values. In short, anti-Westernism and suspicion of the
West were no longer a hallmark of Islamist discourse. 25 A timeline of
the religious-right parties is shown in Figure 3.1.
After the Virtue Party was shut down by the Constitutional Court
in June 2001, the movement formally split. The traditionalists estab-
lished the Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi (SP)), under the formal leader-
ship of Recai Kutan, with Erbakan exerting the real leadership behind
the scenes. The modernists founded a new party, the AKP, with Erdogan as party chairman,this split represented a fundamental ideological
rift in the Milli Görüş movement.
25 This shift was symbolized by Virtue’s decision to take Welfare’s closure and Erbakan’s ban
from politics to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). As Ihsan Da÷i has noted,
the decision to seek justice in Europe was particularly ironic in light of Erbakan’s past sting-
ing criticism of Europe as unjust, exploitative, and imperialistic. Da÷i, “Transformation of
Islamic Political Identity,” p. 28.
46 The Rise of Political Islam in Turkey
Figure 3.1
Evolution of Religious-Right Parties in Turkey
RAND MG726-3.1
1990s1980s1970s1960s1950s 2000s
Erbakan and friends as independent MPs
Milli Nizam Partisi (National Order Party)
Milli Selamet Partisi (National Salvation Party)
No political parties allowed by National
Security Council
I
MNP
MSP
N P
Refah Partisi (Welfare Party)
Fazilet Partisi (Virtue Party)
Saadet Partisi (Felicity Party)
Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi
(Justice and Development Party)
RP
FP
SP
AKP
76543210 8 9 76543210 8 9 76543210 8 9 76543210 8 9 76543210 8 9 76543210
Active in center-right parties
MNP N P
RP FP
SP
AKP
MSPI
Figure 3.1
Evolution of Religious-Right Parties in Turkey
RAND MG726-3.1
1990s1980s1970s1960s1950s 2000s
Erbakan and friends as independent MPs
Milli Nizam Partisi (National Order Party)
Milli Selamet Partisi (National Salvation Party)
No political parties allowed by National
Security Council
I
MNP
MSP
N P
Refah Partisi (Welfare Party)
Fazilet Partisi (Virtue Party)
Saadet Partisi (Felicity Party)
Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi
(Justice and Development Party)
RP
FP
SP
AKP
76543210 8 9 76543210 8 9 76543210 8 9 76543210 8 9 76543210 8 9 76543210
Active in center-right parties
MNP N P
RP FP
SP
AKP
MSPI
Link : https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/mg726osd.10?seq=16
