Singapore is a religiously diverse country. The 2000 national census reports that 85 per cent
of the population in Singapore profess to belong to a religion, and a recent survey shows that
almost 82 per cent of adolescents believe in some sort of deity (Chew, 2005). A majority of
the population are Buddhists (42.5%), followed by Muslims (14.9%), Christians (14.6%),
Taoists (8.5%) and Hindus (4.0%) (Singapore Department of Statistics, 2000). There are also
adherents of other religions (0.6%) as well as those who profess to have no religion (14.8%).
Among the ethnic groups, the Malays are the most homogenous with 99.6 per cent of Malays
who are Muslims. The rest of the Muslims comprise a small number of Chinese, Eurasians,
and those of Arab and South Asian descent (Kadir, 2004). As almost all Muslims are Malays
in Singapore, this article shall focus on Malay-Muslims, and use the two terms, ‘Malays’ and
‘Muslims’ synonymously.
The religious diversity of Singapore, coupled with the current phenomenon of Islamic
revivalism, makes the management of religion a paramount concern for the government.
Given the fact that citizens have local and global ties and commitments beyond those to the
nation-state, there is a potential conflict between the national loyalty of citizens and transnational loyalty of religious believers. This is particularly relevant to the Muslims in
Singapore. How does the current phenomenon of Islamic revivalism and fundamentalism
affect the Muslims in their role as Singapore Muslims? How does it affect the relationship
between Muslims and non-Muslims in Singapore? What are the implications of Islamic
revivalism for citizenship education in Singapore? These are the questions that will be
explored in this paper. By examining the developments of Islam in Singapore, the paper
explores the challenges and implications these developments have on citizenship education in
the country. This paper explains that citizenship in Singapore is characterised by “civic
republicanism” where the emphasis is on passive, rule-following citizenship. The paper also
discusses the concept of “religious pragmatism” in Singapore where the government adopts a
utilitarian approach towards religions and aims to promote religious harmony in citizenship
education. This paper argues that there is a need for a form of citizenship education in
Singapore which takes into consideration the multiplicity, complexity and intersection of
religion and citizenship. It is further argued that what is needed in citizenship education in
Singapore is not just socialisation into a particular state-sanctioned set of values and views,
but an awareness and appreciation of other religions, especially Islam.
An Introduction to Islam and Islamic Education in Singapore
Islam was spread to Southeast Asia around the 14th century by Arab and Indian traders.
Though the sultans’ conversion, a Muslim community was formed in Singapore at the
beginning of the 19th century, comprising South Asians and Arab Muslims (Siddique, 1986,
quoted in Kadir, 2004). When Singapore became a British colony in the 19th century, the
British, while recognising the sultans as guardians of the Islamic faith, tried to impose secular
laws over shar’iah or Islamic laws and control the Islamic bureaucracy (Mutalib, 2004). To
facilitate the communication between the British and the Muslims, the Muslim Endowments
Board was set up in 1906 and the Muhammedan (sic) Advisory Board in 1915 so that the
Muslim representatives could negotiate with the British government regarding the
administration of Muslim affairs (Kadir, 2004). The introduction of the Muslim Ordinance in
1957 and the establishment of the Shariah Court in 1958 formally placed the Muslims in
Singapore under the Islamic law, shariah. After Singapore’s independence in 1965, the
Singapore government wanted a central body to govern and administer Muslim affairs. The
Majlis Ugama Islam Singapura (MUIS), also known as the Islamic Religious Council of
Singapore, was established in 1968 as a statutory body to advise the President of Singapore
on all matters relating to Islam in Singapore. MUIS’ mission is to broaden and deepen the
Singaporean Muslim Community’s understanding and practice of Islam, while enhancing the
well being of the nation (MUIS, 2005). This is done by setting the Islamic agenda, shaping
religious life and forging the Singaporean Muslim identity. It promotes religious, social,
educational, economic and cultural activities for the Muslims in accordance with the
principles and traditions of Islam as enshrined in the Holy Quran and Sunnah. Among its
principal functions are the administration of pilgrimage affairs and halal certification, the
construction and administration of mosques development and management, and the
administration of Islamic religious schools and Islamic education.
In terms of education, Muslim children receive an Islamic education from a young age
from their family as well as the mosques and “madrasah” which are Islamic religious schools.
Under the Administration of Muslim Law Act, all the madrasah in Singapore came under the
control of MUIS. Historically, madrasah were built by Muslim philantrophists to provide
Islamic education for Muslim children and the earliest one was Madrasah Alsagoff AlArabiyah in 1912. Under the Education Act, each madrasah has its management committee
whose members are appointed by Ministry of Education (MOE) in consultation with MUIS.
There are currently six full-time madrasah and twenty-seven part-time mosque madrasah in
Singapore. The madrasah aim to produce the religious elites to lead the community on
religious matters, while mosque madrasah provide part-time basic Islamic education to
students who attend government schools (Our Madrasah, n.d.). Both religious subjects such
as Islamic Education and Arabic language, and secular subjects such as English and
Mathematics are taught in the madrasah. Students enrolled in these madrasah sit for national
examinations set by the Ministry of Education (MOE): the Primary School Leaving
Examination (PSLE) at the end of the primary school, and the Cambridge Board General
Certificate of Education (GCE) examinations for secondary and pre-university students. On the other hand, mosque madrasah only offer basic religious subjects since its students are
already attending full-time government schools and taking the national examinations as part
of the requirements by MOE. Besides the mosques and madrasah, Muslims may also receive
religious instructions from private Islamic kindergartens, and programmes and activities
organized by Muslim organizations such as MENDAKI and People’s Association Malay
Activity Coordinating Council (Mesra).
Islamic Revivalism and Challenges for Singapore
A number of writers have noted the phenomenon of Islamic revivalism in Southeast Asia and
the Re-Islamisation in Singapore (Desker, 2003; Kadir, 2004; Millard, 2004a; Fernandez,
2005; E. Tan, 2005). This is evident in their attire, diet, religious observances and social
interactions (e.g. “Don’t Arabise Malay culture”, The Sunday Times, 18 April 2004; “Is it
cool for Singapore Malays to go Arab?” The Sunday Times, 25 April, 2004). Muslims in
Singapore are influenced by the religious events, doctrines and movements across the world.
Mr Yaacob Ibrahim, Minister-in-charge of Muslim Affairs in Singapore pointed out that
Wahhabism, an extreme teaching of Islam from Saudi Arabia “has touched Indonesia and
influenced us here in Singapore” (quoted in Millard, 2004b). He added that “feeling of
sympathy among local Muslims for Muslims in dire conditions elsewhere is to be expected”
(Yaacob, 2006). Islamic religious teachers in Singapore noted that a minority of Muslims in
Singapore are sympathetic to extremist arguments forwarded by the Jemaah Islamiah (JI) –
an extremist Islamic group in South-east Asia (Hussain, 2005). To this group of people, they
believe that the Singapore government is opposed to Islam, that Muslims in Singapore are
oppressed, and that Muslims should not mix with non-Muslims. An Islamic religious teacher
in Singapore cautioned that this group of Muslims risk becoming militant and are likely to
support and become involved in terrorism (ibid.).
The Islamic revivalism in Singapore reflects the intersection between national and
religious identities and the tensions, complications and conflicts that could result from the
“plural identity in the same individual” (Breidlid & Nicolaisen, 1999, pp. 148-149, quoted in
Chidester, 2000, p. 45). The tensions could result from the multiple duties and loyalties a
religious believer faces as a citizen of a country. Complicating the issue is the fact many
citizens have local and global ties and commitments beyond those to the nation-state
(Jackson, 2003). There is a potential conflict between the national loyalty of citizens and
trans-national loyalty of religious believers. This is particularly relevant to the Muslims in
Singapore. A National Survey on Religion in 1989 reported that 95 per cent of Muslims view
religion and religious education as important, the highest among the religious groups in
Singapore (“Religion in Singapore: report of national survey”, The Straits Times, 8 April,
1989, p. 20). A Gallup survey of 1000 households in 2000 showed that Malays identified
chiefly with religion, while Chinese identified primarily with ethnicity and neighbourhood
(Kadir and Horiuchi, 2003, quoted in Kadir, 2004). The potential conflict between national
and religious loyalties also blurs the distinction between public and private sphere. One
consequence of Islamic revivalism is that Muslims may find it increasingly difficult to put
national interests above the personal desire to take one’s faith seriously – even if it means to
express one’s religious views in the public arena. Chidester (2000) argues the traditional
models for managing religious diversity, which have been based on the distinction between
the public and the private, have to be rejected. There is a need to locate the study of religion
within the constant process of struggle and negotiation over citizenship (Yuval-Davis, 1997;
Chidester, 2003). The tensions arising from the potentially conflicting national and religious
identities in citizens are evident in the case of Malay-Muslims in Singapore.
The first challenge faced by Malay-Muslims is the threat of religious fundamentalism,
which was felt acutely in the arrests of Jemaah Islamiah (JI) terrorists in December 2001 and
August 2002 for attempting to commit violent attacks against western embassies and
Singapore key points (Tan, 2002; Desker, 2003). The former Senior Minister Mr. Lee Kuan
Yew explained that it was peer pressure from the Middle East that convinced Singapore
Muslims to join the JI to fight for all oppressed Muslims worldwide (quoted in Hong, 2003,
p. 5). To the small group of Muslims in Singapore, they are faced with the conflict between
the national loyalty of citizens and the trans-national loyalty of religious believers. This
tension also has implications for inter-religious harmony in Singapore. The rise of religious
fundamentalism and the terrorist attacks by extremist Islamic group worldwide have
contributed to inter-religious tensions between the Muslims and others in Singapore
(Gopinathan & Sharpe, 2004). Yaacob Ibrahim, Minister-in-charge of Muslims Affairs noted
that “certain recent events may have affected trust and confidence levels between the various
communities” (“Code on religious harmony to be unveiled early next year”, Channel News
Asia, 21 October 2002). The former Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong highlighted what he
called “irrational fears” among Muslims and non-Muslims in the wake of the arrests of 15
Muslim men for terrorism-related activities that are festering beneath the façade of religious
harmony (Fernandez, 2002). Many Malay-Muslims in Singapore were consequently affected
by the public scrutiny, as pointed out by the MUIS President:
Not only did it [the Muslim community in Singapore] have to grapple with the
shocking revelation that some members of the community were involved in insidious
activities that threatened society’s peace and harmony, it also had to contend with
unrelenting public scrutiny over the tenability of Islamic practices in a modern,
secular and multiethnic polity (Haji, 2002, p. 2, quoted by E. Tan, 2005)
Secondly, it is difficult to separate the public sphere from the private sphere for
Muslims in Singapore. In fact, more religious believers and groups are inclined to share their
religious views on national matters in the public domain. A survey shows that six out of 10
want the Government to consider religious beliefs when making policy (Low, 2005). This is
unsurprising since national policies and debates on issues such as stem-cell research, organ
donation and casinos are intricately linked to moral and religious considerations. Religious
believers argue against the relegation of our deepest held convictions to the private sphere
and pretend that they have no bearing in the political arena (Chui, 2005). A good example is
the year-long debate on whether Singapore should have a casino on the island. The debate
saw many religious believers stating their religious convictions against the building of the
casino, and statements from religious groups objecting to the casino. The anti-casino lobby
included MUIS which publicly aired its stand after seven Muslim organisations urged the
council in a joint statement last month to convince the Government to refrain from
legitimising the casino industry (Azhar, 2005). It is evident that the Muslims saw a greater
need to assert their views in public.
The third concern is the impact Islamic revivalism has on the relationship between
Muslims and non-Muslims in Singapore. While negative or inflammatory remarks about
another religion could be made quietly in the past, modern technology – with blogging,
emailing, SMS-ing and internet chatting – has allowed information, news and rumours to
spread fast and wide. In the current climate of religious tensions between Muslims and nonMuslims, this individualistic expression of speech can potentially aggravate inter-religious
distrust and conflicts. In such a climate of religious tension between the Muslims and nonMuslims, it is likely for misunderstanding to occur. A recent example is the case of three
Chinese non-Muslim youths who were convicted in court for posting inflammatory remarks
against Muslims. In the first case, two men (aged 27 and 25 years old) were jailed for
spewing vulgarities at the Muslim Malay community, comparing their religion to Satanism
(Chong, 2005). Apparently, their remarks were posted after a Muslim wrote to the press
asking if cab companies allow dogs to be transported in taxis. This question is important to
the Muslims whose religion forbids them to come into contact with a dog’s saliva. It is
reported that their remarks on the blogs sparked off more than 200 comments, some of which
involved the slinging of racial slurs at Chinese and Malays (“Opinion on Net not an
unfettered right”, The Straits Times, 8 October, 2005). Although they are young Singaporeans
who have learnt about moral values in schools and claimed to have friends who subscribe to
that religion (Nadarajan 2005), they remain so extreme and misguided in their views towards
that religion. In the second case, a 17-year old boy was convicted for posting offensive
comments about Malays and their religion on his blog, calling it “The Second Holocaust”.
Rather than sentencing him to jail, the judge ordered that he be sentenced to 180 hours of
community work at Malay-Muslim welfare organisation under a Malay-Muslim probation
officer who can “act as a positive Malay role model” for the youth. This sentence was
welcomed by Muslim community leaders; a Muslim leader said: “You can give a jail
sentence but after the sentence, he may still not understand the other side of the story and the
culture” (quoted in Chong, 2005
Link : file:///C:/Users/HP/Downloads/ECSJ-proof_Tan.pdf
