Good Minzu and bad Muslims: Islamophobia in China’s state media

1 INTRODUCTION

“We must urge our family and friends that it is necessary to firmly resist the influence of religious extremism, and resolutely defend ethnic unity and national integration,” implores an op-ed. column that graced the pages of The People’s Daily (Renmin Ribao), China’s leading national newspaper, on May 29, 2014. The column appeared a little over a month after a group of Uyghur assailants from Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region armed with knives killed 31 people at the rail station in the city of Kunming. Continuing, the author asserted, “We must vigorously pass on to others our positive energy, our love of country, our love of Xinjiang, our love of our brothers and sisters of all nationalities, and use our actions to restore the true name of the people of Xinjiang!” (Tian, Yu, & Hu, 2014). By singling out the perpetrators as agents sponsored by sinister forces seeking to disrupt China’s stability, the article deflected discussions of ethnic strife and reiterated the state-approved narrative of harmonious interethnic relations.

In the following years, The People’s Daily repeated these calls for resistance against religious extremism on numerous occasions. In an essay published on September 25, 2015, the paper reminded citizens that “ethnic unity is the most cherished, most valuable treasure for all the people of Xinjiang, but it can easily be destroyed by only a small handful of people. In the face of terrorist activities, members of Xinjiang society from all walks of life—party officials, college students and teachers, religious leaders, etc.—are filled with righteous indignation and step forward bravely to unmask the true face of the ‘Three Forces’ (of terrorism, separatism, and extremism)” (Fan, 2015). As before, the paper echoed party state-approved messages and reasserted its claims that the actions of outsider extremists distorted the ‘true’ nature of China’s ethnic politics. In the version of events offered by The People’s Daily, China’s ethnic minorities (shaoshu minzu) stood valiantly against the so-called three forces (sange shili) of separatism, terrorism and extremism threatening to destroy China’s vibrant, multicultural unity.¹ In calling on citizens to embrace the true, peaceful nature of ethnic relations, the paper, again, downplayed conflict with China’s Muslim minorities, rendering them instead as peaceful, model citizens.

However, as these public calls for unity and vigilance rang out across the pages of The People’s Daily, a very different kind of rhetoric brewed up on the Chinese internet. In the years following the 2014 Kunming attack, China’s Muslims reported an increase in online harassment. Chinese takeout services which delivered specialty halal meals were bombarded with angry anti-Islamic comments (Lo, 2017). A feature from Hong Kong’s South China Morning Post recounted an instance in which a young Hui woman from Kunming who posted an image of herself and her friends wearing a hijab on the social media platform, Weixin, was pilloried with hateful comments. Some of the aggressors proclaimed “China needs no evil cults!” while others demanded “when are you going back to Arabia?” (Zhou, 2017b). An article in The Independent documented a similar case from Hefei, the capital of Anhui Province, where a community’s plan to build a community mosque was met with vitriolic online backlash. According to the community imam, these threats soon crossed into offline acts of harassment as a pig’s head was buried on the construction site, protestors rallied with anti-Muslim banners and members of the Muslim community began to receive death threats via text (Shih, 2017).

Incidents like these point to a growing tide of Islamophobia in China. This rise in instances of online harassment of Hui and Uyghur Muslims coincided with a nationwide crackdown on Islamic identity. Did official rhetoric from the state prime netizens to unleash such virulent antagonism? Examining the official media depictions of Islam and Muslims provides an opportunity to examine the connection between regime rhetoric and public opinion. Indeed, China’s state-run media is a powerful tool for shaping public discourse and setting boundaries on what the state deems acceptable dialogue on current events and public policy (Brady, 2008; Lynch, 1999; Stockmann, 2013). As such, state media coverage presents a prism through which the Chinese party state’s ideology, policy priorities, and values may be seen. Accordingly, this article assesses whether the violent sentiments that netizens espoused towards domestic Islamic communities online mirrored the posture and rhetoric of the Chinese party state.

In the remainder of this article, I further assess this relationship between official media and popular sentiment by examining depictions of Islam and Muslims in China’s official media. In so doing, I employ qualitative content analysis to introduce a typology of these descriptions and analyse the manner in which they were presented. By systematically analysing how official media described Muslims, I may discern whether netizen harassment on social media platforms resembled the party state line.

First, I present a brief overview of the role played by official media in disseminating legitimating narratives for the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP). In particular, I assess how party state guidance on sensitive subjects like interethnic relations attempts to frame coverage in a way that reinforces CCP-approved messages and supports the regimes legitimating claims. Moreover, I assess how this close cooperation establishes clear parameters around how media outlets discuss ethnic politics and mark out taboos in public discourse.

To identify the political messages surrounding Islam and Muslims embedded in official media, I present a mixed-methods case study of coverage of the subjects in The People’s Daily (Renmin Ribao). After an overview which outlines the status of Islam and Muslim ethnic groups in China in the decade following the violence that erupted in Urumqi, in July 2009, I conduct a qualitative content analysis of articles published in the paper. Drawing on a sample of 70 articles published between 2014 and 2018, I employ the analytical technique of constant comparative analysis to build empirically derived typology of descriptions of Islam and Muslims appearing in articles printed in the paper. After establishing this taxonomy of descriptions, I employ basic cross-tabulation analysis to compare the frequency with which the paper employed these different characterizations. Lastly, to demonstrate how state media invoked these portrayals, I conduct textual analysis on the sampled articles.

After this extensive analysis of the sampled text, I assess how the tone of coverage compares to popular anger online. I conclude that The People’s Daily‘s coverage emphasized the ethnic identity of domestic Muslim ethnic groups—the Hui and Uyghurs—while highlighting the Islamic identity of Muslim communities abroad. I contend that, through this strategy of ethnizicing the identities of domestic Muslims, the CCP attempts to reinforce legitimating narratives that emphasize the party state’s role in providing stability in interethnic relations, institute controls on expression of ethnic and religious identities, and to discredit resistance from Muslim ethnic minorities as the work of extremists manipulated by a dangerous foreign religious ideology. I also explore why these depictions do not align with tone and content of netizens’ virulent harassment. I suggest that the media’s depiction of international Islamists, and Islam itself, as dangerous creates a framing that indirectly arouses suspicion towards expression of religious belief or outward religious behaviour on the part of China’s Muslims. By de-emphasizing the religious identity of China’s Islamic ethnic minorities, the state creates a framing in which any outward religious behaviour may be taken as a sign of dangerous extremism. Further, I propose that, by extensively praising China’s Muslim minorities, The People’s Daily might activate and deepen the ethnic resentments of Han chauvinist netizens and erode their trust in state media. Finally, I call for a closer study of everyday roots of Islamophobia in China. I conclude with a call for a thorough examination of the daily interactions and ordinary practices which engender fear of and antipathy for Muslims among China’s mass public.

2 OFFICIAL MEDIA AND AUTHORITARIAN MESSAGING IN CHINA

As in other authoritarian states, China’s media provides the party state with a highly visible platform for conducting ‘thought work’ (sixiang gongzuo), and broadcasting the regime’s legitimating narrative (Brady, 2009; Kern & Hainmueller, 2009; Lynch, 1999; Saich, 2011; Stockmann & Gallagher, 2011; Zhao, 2008, 24). Zhao (2008, 24) contends that the Central Propaganda Department (CPD) is an ‘omnipresent body’ which uses its great influence for the purpose of ‘sustaining the party’s dominance in the area of ideology and culture’. While characterizations of the Post-Mao era of ‘Reform and Opening’ depict China as adopting neoliberal measures that reduced party state control in the area of enterprise, the CCP’s micromanagement of the media expanded during this period (Zhao, 2008). Indeed, Brady (2009, 434) asserts, “assiduous attention to the techniques of mass persuasion” allowed the CCP to weather the challenges posed by the 1989 Tiananmen demonstrations and stabilize its rule.

As part of this oversight, the party state establishes guidelines that point to both approved narratives and clear ‘no-go’ subjects for coverage (Lynch, 1999, 3). Official media outlets act as mouthpieces for the regime to influence public opinion and create a broad sense of agreement and consensus around the CCP’s preferred narrative (Brady, 2008; Zhao, 2008, 36). These sources distort or obscure information unfriendly to the party state, mischaracterize events and offer citizens coverage that is nothing more than nationalistic propaganda that trumpets the regime’s success and papers over its faults (Brady, 2008, 71).

The success of such efforts requires a careful balance on the part of the CCP. While readers perceive ‘dangbao’ (party-sponsored papers), like The People’s Daily, as presenting reliably accurate expressions of the CCP’s policy priorities, they are not viewed as credible or objective in reporting ‘real news’. Instead, as the epitome of a state-owned newspaper that is closed off to privatization and reform, The People’s Daily is widely understood as xuanchuan (propaganda) that presents only positive messaging and discusses sensitive issues in a light which reflects the CCP-approved line (Stockmann, 2010, 273–75). Unfavourable or dissenting points of view do not appear in such publications. While the reform era brought changes in the media landscape that allow for reporting which demands greater accountability and even lodges some critique at a localized level, the decisions of the party leadership or strategic priorities of the central government remain off-limits for reproach (Y. Yang et al. 2014, 46–48).

Such a tightly controlled message on sensitive issues may only further stoke interest in topics considered taboo. While The People’s Daily may be seen as reporting on issues in a way that is generic, or abstract, alternative sources—especially new media sources like microblogging or social media platforms—may be seen to mirror more closely the experiences of ordinary people (Stockmann, 2013, 170–76). Netizens seeking less filtered commentary may turn to these alternative sources and invest more trust in them to convey public sentiment more accurately (Shen et al., 2011).

Despite such fissures, however, messaging in official state media does succeed in legitimating the CCP’s leadership. Support for the CCP is strongest among those people who are consistently exposed to state-run media broadcasts, suggesting that propaganda exerts a ‘direct, positive influence’ on popular opinion about the party state (Kennedy 2009, 521–528). As such state media has become a vehicle for the spread of nationalism, and patriotic education (Brady, 2008, 52).

The CCP’s propaganda apparatus employs an array of tactics to accomplish these ends. Through framing (tifa), the party state’s propaganda apparatus sets boundaries on what is and is not acceptable in public discourse. The CPD (Zhongyang Xuanchuan Bu) issues instructions on tifa via classified internal written communications or orally in compulsory formal meetings. As a form of direct guidance from the party, tifa carries the weight of law and is scrupulously observed. In practice, they act as a set of guidelines about what subjects and interpretations are and are not appropriate for publication. Instructions contained within tifa may include fine-grained guidance on the ‘current politically appropriate phraseology’, effectively dictating which words or descriptions ought to be used in particular circumstances (Brady, 2008, 19). Further, these regulations on tone and message establish the core of China’s censorship system by labelling subjects as out of bounds for coverage. These processes assure that competing explanations are removed from official discourse and limit—though they do not eliminate entirely—public access to narratives running counter to the party line (Brady, 2009, 445). These directives from the party state afford a high level of adaptability to state media sources in addressing subjects that might threaten narrative control as they arise (Zhao, 2008, 27).

To maintain the unity of message and consistency in coverage required for mass persuasion, China implements a system of conglomeration and cooperation (Stockmann & Gallagher, 2011, 442). Frequently this means that the propaganda department must coordinate with other ministries or organs of the party state to shape messaging on a given subject. This practice helps to diffuse the responsibilities of censorship by ‘turning each government department into de facto gatekeepers’ of what content is appropriate (Zhao, 2008, 28, 32–34).

3 REPORTING ON ETHNICITY IN CHINESE STATE MEDIA

On the subject of ethnic affairs, the propaganda apparatus enacts stringent gatekeeping measures and relies on the collaborations of an ‘ethnic sector’ formed among the CPD, the United Front Work Department (UFWD, Tongyi Zhanxian Gongzuo Bu), and the State Ethnic Affairs Council (SEAC, Guojia Minzu Shiwu Weiyuanhui) (Brady, 2013). The image of China produced by this close coordination is one of a unified, multiethnic country.

The CCP’s consistent portrayal of minorities as a loyal and dependent— if exotic—’other’ fosters attitudes of internal orientalism among the majority Han. Such a portrayal of ethnic minorities as peripheral promotes a view among the Han that the inclusion of ethnic minorities in the Chinese state represents a step in a ‘civilizing project’ taken on by the Han (Harrell, 1995, 3–36; Cliff, 2016b, 27–49). State media emphasizes the CCP’s role in bringing modernity to these ethnic communities, thus encouraging attitudes of Han centrism with reinforcing media coverage of ethnic minorities. Stevan Harrell (2001, 304) reasons that “however poor and disadvantaged they may feel, (Han) still think of themselves as superior to minorities in at least some respects.” Describing this phenomenon, Schein (1997) argues that the CCP’s depictions of ethnic minorities in popular media reinforce the notion of a Chinese civilizational construct in which the Han occupy and advanced position at the centre and the non-Han inhabit a place on the backward periphery.

Frequently, such coverage emphasizes the advantages the CCP bestows on ethnic minorities through preferential politics (youhui zhengce). Such praise allows the party state to claim fulfilment of its promises to establish social and economic equality between the various groups residing within its borders (Zhang et al., 2018). Such reporting intends to solidify ethnic unity and minimize the potential for ethnic conflict. State media is forbidden from publishing on ethnic conflict or printing anything that might stir ethnic resentments, such as derogatory commentary on traditional ethnic culture (Brady, 2008). Rather, official reports promote negative propaganda to target and discredit figures, like former World Uyghur Congress (WUC) leader Rebiya Kadeer or the Dalia Lama, as ‘splittists’, ‘terrorists’ or ‘traitors’ (Brady, 2013).

This kind of negative propaganda allows the party state to portray those who challenge its narrative as foils to ‘normal’ or ‘good’ members of the group. By signalling out figures like Kadeer or the WUC as ‘extremist’ the party state sets them apart from other ‘normal’ Muslims who do not challenge the CCP’s rule. Doing so enables the regime to create a version of Islam in line with state objectives. Likewise, showcasing ‘good’ Muslims who express support for the CCP reinforces the narrative of the party state’s tolerant stance towards multicultural pluralism.

4 ISLAMIC MINORITIES AND THE CHINESE PARTY STATE

Though state media paints the picture of China as a cooperative environment for religious and ethnic harmony, the recent history of Chinese Muslims’ relationships with the party state, and the non-Muslim, majority Han Chinese reveals long-simmering tensions. Though the period between 1997 and 2009 saw a relatively peaceful phase of relations in China’s northwest, the history of China’s relationships with its Muslim communities is marked by sporadic incidents of conflict (Millward, 2009). During the 18th and 19th centuries, spates of internecine conflicts in Muslim communities in peripheral areas (in particular the northwestern provinces of Qinghai, Gansu and Xinjiang, and the southwestern province of Yunnan) provoked the intervention of the Qing state, which often employed brutal force in suppression (Atwill, 2005; Kim, 2004; Lipman, 1981; Schluessel, 2020).

Occasional outbursts of violence and clashes with the state persisted after the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). In 1975, People’s Liberation Army (PLA) troops aggressively shelled and fought a pitched battle with Hui villagers engaged in an uprising in the small, rural village of Shadian in Yunnan (Solinger, 1982; Turnbull, 2015). Similarly, after the consolidation of PRC control in Xinjiang in the 1950s, tensions frequently flared between the state and ethnic Uyghur communities. Since the 1990s, cycles of violence and repression punctuate the course of ethnic politics in Xinjiang, exacerbating the tensions already present between China’s Muslims and the majority Han (Gladney, 2007; Roberts, 2020). Prominent among these incidents were the 1997 protests in Ghulja, which deteriorated into rioting and brutal repression by the police (Smith Finley, 2011). In July 2009 violence in Urumqi, the capital of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region resurrected old prejudices against Uyghurs and tipped off a new round of suppression and resistance between the state and Uyghurs in Xinjiang (Finley, 2011; Roberts, 2020). The attack by Uyghurs on the Kunming train station in April 2014—which left 31 civilians dead—marked a new phase in the continuing saga of ethnic violence. After Kunming, the PRC employed a firmer hand in dealing with separatism. However, attempts to create security around Islam potentially achieved the opposite, leaving Muslims more vulnerable to radicalization and Han more prone to feel that the state lacked the capacity to handle the violence (Trédaniel & Lee, 2018).

The motivations behind these conflicts are economic and cultural as well as political (Millward, 2009). Rosalyn Lim linked the continued outbreak of violence to the failure of China’s ethnic minority policies to foster a sense of equality between ethnic groups, particularly in the case of the Uyghurs (Lim, 2012). Many Uyghurs, especially entrepreneurs, feel marginalized as they are pushed out of all but niche industries that produce ethnic goods or are forced to rely on Han partners to succeed (Harlan, 2016; Cliff, 2016a). Han in-migration to Xinjiang and the stratification of income along ethnic lines reinforce Uyghurs’ feelings of marginalization as a result of Han political and economic dominance. These grievances against the Han—and to a lesser extent the Hui—make Han citizens in Xinjiang the target of violent reprisal (Côté, 2015).

These social, economic and cultural factors produce a pervasive mistrust and misunderstanding between the groups that further intensifies disputes. Educational programmes—even those like the ‘Xinjiang Class’ (Xinjiang neidi gaozhong ban) which are designed to help facilitate Uyghur integration by providing opportunities for interethnic exchange and communication—often discourage interaction between the groups and do little to mitigate or reduce tensions (Grose, 2020). Uyghurs resent the dilution of their culture and the economic exploitation that occurs as a by-product of Han in-migration and feel disrespected by the Han. Likewise, cultural chauvinism often causes Han to characterize the Uyghurs as lazy, childlike, ignorant, superstitious or even dangerous. Uyghurs are often presumed by the Han to be thieves, or worse, terrorists in league with Islamic fundamentalist groups (Kaltman, 2007).

Nor do such conflicts persist only in Uyghur communities. Tensions and misunderstandings also strain relations between the Han and the Hui—usually portrayed as more integrated into the mainstream of Chinese society than their Uyghur co-religionists (Brophy, 2019).² Indeed, some suggest that the Hui are virtually indistinguishable from the majority Han and that Hui assimilation is nearly complete (Li & Ji, 2015). However, the physical and cultural separation of the Hui from the Han belies the accuracy of such claims (Gaubatz, 2002; Stroup, 2020). In fact, at various points throughout China’s history, disjuncture between Islamic law and the secular law of the state left the relationship between the Hui and the state ‘riddled with microconflicts’ (Erie, 2016, 86–129).

This history of conflict with Muslim communities subsumes official state policy. Responding to fear that foreign extremism may radicalize Muslims—especially in Xinjiang— the state enacted stringent controls on the practice of religion, contributing to a continuing cycle of violence, repression and reprisal. The ‘Strike Hard’ (yanda) campaign, formally enacted by Xi Jinping in 2014, instituted restrictions on religion that included banning Ramadan fasting, a prohibition on growing beards or wearing headscarves, and criminalizing sharing non-government sanctioned religious commentaries or materials (Haas, 2017; Jacobs, 2016a). Testimony from those swept up by the campaign who are now living in exile documents the criminalization of numerous other arbitrarily identified behaviours, such as travelling abroad or using a VPN (Roberts, 2020, 205–213). A system of extensive monitoring, both via digital and in-person means, was constructed to enforce such prohibitions and create an atmosphere of near-total surveillance (Grose, 2021; Millward, 2018; Roberts, 2018). Violations of these policies have been punished with indefinite detention in internment camps—for the alleged purpose of de-radicalization—often without first undergoing public trial (Millward, 2018; Phillips, 2018; Roberts, 2020, 212–20). By 2018, estimates of the number of people detained in these camps reached as high as 2,000,000 (Roberts, 2020, 1).

Though Xinjiang serves as a testing ground for many of these policies, they are increasingly enacted elsewhere, even in Hui enclaves, like Linxia in Gansu Province, which had previously stood as model Islamic communities (Zhou, 2017a). In Linxia, these measures include banning children’s Arabic and Qur’anic study classes conducted at community mosques over holiday breaks (Martina, 2018).

These heavy-handed measures intend to align Islam with the state’s objectives. In his address to the 19th Party Congress in October 2017, Jinping (2017) spoke of the need to Sinicize China’s religious communities and ensure that their teaching was aligned with the values of the party state, declaring ‘religions in China must be Chinese in orientation’ and insisting that the CCP ‘provide active guidance to religions so that they can adapt themselves to socialist society’. However, the attempts to exert further control over religion and criminalize religious behaviours that fall out of step with the state’s priorities, risks the proliferation of further resistance.

5 NETIZEN ISLAMOPHOBIA ON THE CHINESE INTERNET

As the state continued to crack down on Islamic minorities to curb behaviour that it deemed extremist, a rising tide of Islamophobia emerged among the Chinese public. A wave of particularly vicious cyber harassment struck out at China’s Muslims following the 2014 attacks in Kunming as online forums like Weixin and Weibo became rumour mills that incubated Islamophobic sentiment. A circle of Han Chinese who called themselves the ‘MuHei’ (Muslim haters) bombarded these platforms with violent and threatening comments, derogatorily referring to Muslims as ‘greens’ (Zhou, 2017b). One post reprinted by Viola Zhou begins ‘let’s shoot 100 greens’. Similarly, Luqiu and Yang’s (2017) study of 10,000 posts related to Islam on Sina Weibo concluded that these posts frequently pinned blame for violence on Muslims—especially Uyghurs—and perpetuated unflattering stereotypes about practicing Muslims. Such ethnicization of threat falls into a familiar pattern on Chinese social media. Leibold (2015) observes that, in China’s chatrooms and message boards, terms like terrorism and extremism are directly linked to ethnicity—often paired with explicit racial slurs.

Profiles of the netizens posting virulently bigoted or threatening messages about Muslims tend to paint them as so-called fenqing (‘angry youth’) nationalists who advocate policies that would promote Han supremacism (Carrico, 2017; Leibold, 2010). These assessments suggest nationalist netizens fear that minority privilege leads to Han disempowerment and cultural erasure. In the minds of these netizens, this renders the Han as the true victim of the state’s policies on ethnicity (Miao, 2020, 752–56). Such studies suggest that Han chauvinists netizens are more prone to conspiratorial thinking that draws binaries between ‘good’ Han and ‘evil’ others (Carrico, 2017, 87–88, 153–54). Adopting a posture of victimhood leads to Islamophobic outbursts in response to perceived favouritism shown to minorities and incubates a sense of outrage at the party state for privileging minorities at the expense of the Han (Miao, 2020, 756–58).

However, recent examinations of Islamophobic, Han Supremacist activity on the internet suggests a wider demographic base than mere fenqing. Zhang’s (2020) case study of Han supremacist posts by zhihu (a question and answer site similar to Quora) users found that strident nationalists on the platform were largely wealthier and more highly educated than the average Chinese citizen. Moreover, Zhang’s findings observed that the Han supremacist tropes about Muslims and ethnic minorities blended previously existing tropes of Han supremacist ideology with those form global far-right populist movements (Zhang, 2020, 95). Merging these two streams of discourse broadens the popular appeal of Islamophobic rhetoric. Likewise, posts antagonizing Muslims became even more visible on mainstream Chinese social media outlets following incidents of violence perpetuated by Muslims in 2014, mirroring global trends (Leibold, 2016; Zhang, 2020).

7 ANALYSIS OF SAMPLED TEXTS

The People’s Daily‘s coverages of Muslims exhibit stark contrasts between characterizations of foreign and domestic communities. In the former case, Muslims appeared alongside depictions of religious extremism, and violent conflict. However, when discussing domestic Muslim communities, The People’s Daily emphasized ethnic rather than religious identity and lauded the contributions of Hui and Uyghurs to China’s economic development and societal harmony.

As indicated above, the second, axial coding stage produced seven substantive categories (and one category which consisted of purely demographic descriptions) of Islam and Muslims across the sampled articles. Figure 1 illustrates these depictions in a pie chart. Across all articles, Islam and Muslims were most frequently described with language falling under the category of Upstanding—stressing patriotism, cooperation, civic-mindedness and religious moderation. Descriptions that fell under the category of Dangerous—emphasizing extremism, violence and difficulty in assimilating—made up the second largest set of descriptions.

However, these raw totals do not provide a full understanding of the coverage. Closer examination of the results of coding illustrates that state media employs a different set of characterizations when describing Islam generally from those it uses to describe China’s Muslim minority groups. A tabulation of the frequency of the occurrence of each code across all articles (see Table 2) reveals that The People’s Daily described Islam and Muslims as ‘dangerous’ with greater frequency than it did Hui or Uyghurs. In absolute terms, the articles described Islam as ‘dangerous’ in 48 instances. Muslims received this kind of characterization 18 times. Uyghurs were described as dangerous only 11 times, while Hui were not characterized in this manner at all.

TABLE 2. Characterizations of Muslims by frequency

Code	Advanced	Backward	Dangerous	Essentialized	Upstanding	Virtuous	Vulnerable
Islam	11	2	48	11	43	6	13
Hui	12	4	0	9	17	7	8
Muslim	6	4	18	5	34	5	23
Uyghur	36	27	11	23	71	49	17

Moreover, the articles characterized Islam as dangerous (48 instances) slightly more often than they described the faith as upstanding (43 instances). The paper frequently mentioned international Muslim communities like those in the Middle East or Europe alongside discussion of Islamist or extremist groups, like ISIS. Likewise, the paper called attention to how extremist religious ideologies justified or valorized the brutal and violent actions. By contrast, Uyghurs were described as upstanding (71 instances) far more often than they were described as dangerous (18 instances). Similar discrepancies occur in the characterization of the Hui (17 instances of characterization as ‘upstanding’, versus no characterizations as dangerous). Thus, while coverage of international Islamic communities routinely painted pictures of extreme ideologies and violent conflict, it routinely lauded the virtues of domestic Muslim minorities (see Table 3).

TABLE 3. Descriptions of international Muslims versus China’s Muslims

Code	Dangerous	Upstanding
Hui	0	17
Uyghur	11	71
International	49	20

In part, these differences reflect The People’s Daily‘s ethnicization of China’s Muslim minorities, especially as compared to global Islam. In the latter case, the paper seldom noted the status of Hui and Uyghurs as Muslims. Mentions of the Hui or Uyghurs rarely occurred alongside invocations of Islam. Only two articles published over the 4-year period mentioned both the Hui and Islam. A mere three articles discussed both the Uyghurs and Islam. By comparison, descriptions of foreign Muslim communities (coded as ‘international’) overlapped with specific discussion of the Islamic faith in 10 articles. In describing international Islamic communities, The People’s Daily focused on Muslimness as a key component of the story, unlike the relatively de-Islamicized portrayals of their Hui and Uyghur co-religionists.

The dissociation of the Hui and Uyghur from their Muslimness prioritized ethnic identities above religious ones when describing the groups. When portrayed in this manner, as ethnic groups (frequently translated in Chinese as minzu) stripped of association with faith, they may be contrasted to the Islamic community at large. Portraying Hui and Uyghurs as ethnic minorities (shaoshu minzu) first and foremost, The People’s Daily casts outward religious observance as an aberration from the norm. Emphasizing the Muslimness of international Islamic communities reinforced these associations of Islam with abnormality, especially when international Muslims frequently appeared alongside images of violence. On these grounds, the party state characterized those believers who prioritized a religious identity as out of line with the mainstream or as potential religious extremists.

Examining the frequency of application of individual codes from within the categories of ‘dangerous’ and ‘upstanding’ illustrates this difference even more clearly (see Table 4). Uyghurs were described as extremist in only one instance across the articles. Similarly, Hui never received such characterization. However, international Islamic communities were described as containing extremist groups or being prone to religious extremism 42 times. Neither Hui nor Uyghurs were characterized as the perpetrators of violent acts. By contrast, international Muslims were described as committing acts of violence in 19 instances.

TABLE 4. Differences in characterization between Chinese and international Muslims

Code	Extremist	Unassimilated	Violent	Cooperative	Moderate	Patriotic
Hui	0	0	0	9	0	1
Uyghur	1	9	0	40	9	8
International	42	1	19	3	5	0

Such frequent invocations of extremism cast Islam itself as inherently prone to violence. Discussion of sectarian violence or terrorist groups emphasized clashes between Islam and the state, suggesting that the conflicts pitted religious fundamentalists against secular forces. In one particularly acute example, the paper described, in extensive and graphic detail, the violent carnage wrought by the Islamic State’s attacks in Syria (Han, 2017a). This coverage rarely mentioned that such violence was perpetuated by Muslims against other Muslims. Similar stories described the effort of the Egyptian government to prevent the growth of extremist networks which might attempt regime change (Han, 2017b).

When discussing Islam in non-Muslim majority countries, the paper highlighted tensions between religion and secular western governments. Several articles discussed the difficulties faced by European states, like Belgium, in integrating Muslims into mainstream society. Often, these reports remarked that Muslims remained apart from others, living in enclave communities where the threat of radicalization loomed large. These accounts centred on the state’s attempts to stem the tide of radicalization and prevent young Muslims from going to Syria or Iraq to join ISIS (Ren et al., 2016). Elsewhere, The People’s Daily reported on the struggles of Muslims living in the United States. Noting their status as a religious minority, these accounts of Islam in America emphasized the levels of discrimination and prejudice faced by American Muslims due to their religious faith (Gao & Huang, 2017; Zhang, 2016a, 2016b).

By frequently emphasizing conflict between Islam and the state, The People’s Daily presented a picture of Islam as a threat to secular, multiculturalism. Whether by depicting Muslims as extremists engaged in direct combat with the state or as fundamentalists who refused to integrate into mainstream society, the articles reinforced sentiments that in countries across the globe, Islam threatened to clash against forces of the state and produce destabilizing social dilemmas.

In contrast to such bleak depictions of global Islam, The People’s Daily painted a far more optimistic picture of religious life in China. As Table 5 shows, Hui and Uyghurs were commended for their dedication to interethnic cooperation (coded as cooperative) a total of 49 times combined. These descriptions frequently lauded the groups’ dedication to the ideals of minzu tuanjie (interethnic unity) and praised the harmony of multiethnic communities in which Uyghurs and Hui lived alongside Han and Mongolian neighbours. Likewise, in a series of assessments on the status of religious freedom in Xinjiang published in June 2016, The People’s Daily chronicled the region’s history as a home to a diverse array of religious faiths, including Buddhism, Manicheanism and Daoism. One article in the series, surveying the present-day religious landscape of the region, noted that “even though Islam has become the principle religion of Xinjiang, the coexistence of multiple faiths continues there to this day” (The People’s Daily (Renmin Ribao), 2016). In recounting the region’s history of religious pluralism, The People’s Daily simultaneously marked Islam as a foreign religion and distanced Hui and Uyghurs from their Muslim identities.

TABLE 5. Depictions of Muslims as beneficiaries of state assistance

Code	Poor	Dependent	Deferential	Grateful	Protected
Hui	0	4	0	0	3
Uyghur	5	10	2	1	5
International	2	2	0	0	0

Indeed, rather than associating China’s Muslim minorities with extremist violence, articles run in The People’s Daily went to great lengths to distance them from terrorist groups. An article from July 12, 2014 republished an open letter from 354 delegates of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Regional Minzu Chamber of Commerce, which denounced extremist violence and proclaimed religious violence to be out of line with Uyghur culture:

We Uyghurs are a civilized people. We are a people who cherish knowledge. We are a hospitable people. We are a kindhearted people. Terrorists use the majestic religion of Islam as a pretense. They use it as a means of inflicting unspeakably brutal violence on innocent people, and to trample life. They do not represent us Uyghurs, or even Muslims. They are but an extremely few violent terrorists. (L. Han, 2014)

Instead, coverage of Hui and Uyghur communities often stressed the groups’ gratitude to the Han-centric party state for providing economic aid (see Table 5). In several feature articles meant to promote a narrative of interethnic harmony, the paper recounted the story of communities of poor Muslim minorities—especially Uyghurs—who appreciatively received the charitable aid of benevolent, selfless Han (Dai, Tian, Hu, & Yang, 2014; Dai, Tian, Yu, & Renba, 2014; Liu, 2015). The reports observed Uyghurs’ indebtedness to the Han for a diverse array of charitable acts, such as furnishing adequate healthcare, establishing successful commerce in minority communities, or providing aid to minorities in managing their flocks.

Other stories made such arguments about dependence directly by explicitly describing the special protections Muslim minorities received from the party state. A profile of a Uyghur migrant enclave in Wuhan, capital of Hubei Province in eastern China, detailed the creation of a government aid programme to help recently-arrived migrants integrate into the community and set up small businesses. The programme, the article attested, sought to give Uyghurs ‘a good foundation’ to build on once they arrived in the community (Gu & Wen, 2014). One article, written in the aftermath of an earthquake in rural Xinjiang in 2015, described the efforts of the military to secure safe spaces in which Uyghur faithful could observe Ramadan prayer services. The reporting quoted a thankful Uyghur man who testified “In the face of this disaster, we are all one family” (The People’s Daily (Renmin Ribao), 2015).

Not only did these stories render Uyghurs as thankful to the Han, and by extension the centralizing forces of party state, they also emphasized a state of dependence. Without Han assistance, the articles suggested, Muslim minorities would lack access to the public goods associated with prosperity and modernity. In citing specific government-sponsored programmes as ensuring migrant Muslims’ well-being, The People’s Daily portrayed the CCP as directly responsible for providing these groups with access to prosperity. Escaping poverty and destitution came only with the assistance of the party state.

Such characterizations of Muslim gratitude towards and dependence upon the party state dovetail with coverage that emphasized the exceptional degree of patriotism civic mindedness displayed by Hui and Uyghur communities. One article praised the efforts of two young Uyghur girls who presented Xi Jinping with hand-stitched brocade embroidery at the Beijing exhibition celebrating the 60th anniversary of the founding of Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. The article drew attention to the harmonious message of the stitching, which proclaimed “Join together to build the Chinese Dream!” (Yang & Hao, 2015). In a series of articles profiling the ‘Sino-Arab International Exhibition’ (Zhong-A Bolanhui) held in Yinchuan, capital of the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region, The People’s Daily celebrated the key role played by the Hui in building the foundations of China’s ‘One Belt, One Road’ project. According to article Hui in Ningxia served an instrumental role in extending cultural outreach to the Islamic world (Li, 2015; Xu et al., 2015; Xu & Zhu, 2014). In these incidents, the paper characterized China’s Islamic minorities as willing and enthusiastic patriots doing their part to further China’s economic development.

In depicting China’s Muslim minorities as moderate, patriotic, and grateful citizens reliant on the benefits provided by the state, The People’s Daily minimized their association with Islam, effectively ethnicizng them. The paper’s coverage set them apart from their international co-religionists, whose devotion to Islam was often depicted as extreme. Promoting these types of images rendered Islam itself as dangerous and prone to violence. By contrast, China’s Muslims, rendered in ways that stressed their ethnic identity and belonging to the family of zhonghua minzu (Chinese nationalities), were shown to practice their faith in a CCP-approved way.⁴ The Muslims portrayed by official media contributed to implementation of China’s development, safeguarded its societal stability, renounced extremist religious ideologies from abroad, and patriotically affirmed the unity of the Chinese state.

A profile of a small, multiethnic community in the Tianshan Mountains published on May 29, 2015 best illustrates the rhetorical bent of the coverage. In describing the relations between the Han and Uyghurs who lived together in the community, the article painted a picture of harmonious cooperation and mutual respect between the groups. “In Xinjiang, minzu tuanjie is the lifeline of people of all nationalities,” the article declared. It continued to proclaim “Minzu tuanjie is the fundamental guarantor of long-term peace and stability.” Because of these powerful qualities of ethnic unity, the article observed that “Xinjiang energetically promotes minzu tuanjie, and advocates for the mutual respect, understanding, and trust of all nationalities. Hand in hand, we all work together to build a more beautiful home.” Underlining this spirit of cooperation, the article concluded by quoting a local Uyghur citizen who professed, “We’re just like one great big family” (Tian et al., 2014).

8 IMPLICATIONS

The coverage of Islam and Muslims by The People’s Daily between 2014 and 2018 reflects the party state attempts to shape public opinion through extensive framing. To promote an image of ethnic unity that aligned with a legitimating narrative which lauded the CCP as a provider of broad societal stability, official state media drew stark contrasts between international Islam and China’s Muslim minorities. The paper’s coverage framed international Islam as dangerous, highlighting the religious identities of extremist groups and emphasizing their Muslimness. By contrast, the paper ethnicized its presentation of domestic Muslim minorities, largely stripping away mentions of their Islamic faith. These stories played up the groups’ unique ethnic cultures and placed a spotlight on their patriotism and sense of civic duty to state.

Such sharply divergent portrayals of foreign and domestic Islamic communities sought to externalize China’s own religious tensions, attributing incidents of violence in Muslim communities to extremist adherents of a foreign, dangerous religious tradition. Doing so attempted to frame these incidents as the work of outside threat, rather than the cause of legitimate grievances sparked by CCP policy. Purporting that Hui and Uyghurs were part of the family of zhonghua minzu allowed the party state to emphasize its own tolerance of ethnic difference and trumpet its success in maintaining harmonious interethnic relations.

Likewise, The People’s Daily’s portrayals also served as a means of control, marking the boundaries of appropriateness for religious observance and expression. Much like other aspects of China’s policies on ethnicity, these portrayals of Muslim ethnic minorities seek to establish what Louisa Schein (2000) refers to as ‘certain permissible forms of difference’ that can be overseen and managed by the state. By setting standards for an acceptable expression of Islamic identity, the CCP may attest that they allow for tolerance of religious difference, while also establishing parameters which allow for the ‘occlusion of all other sorts of unruly heterogeneity’ (Schein, 2000, 73). As such, The People’s Daily‘s mostly positive coverage of Hui and Uyghurs as cooperative, obedient and reliant on the state’s aid serves as a foil for its coverage of global Islam as violent and extreme. Employing such descriptions allows the state to promote its own, state-approved manner of practicing the faith, while associating non-sanctioned practices with radical and violent Islamism.

However, the gap between official state media and popular discourse seemingly indicates that such rose-tinted messages from the CCP, which stress harmony and equality, create unintended consequences, mostly in the form of Han resentments. Indeed, the CCP’s efforts to use mass media to promote a state-approved narrative may inspire a backlash and work at cross-purposes to the party state’s intent (Terrone, 2016). Schein (1997) contends that the self-other contrasts inherent to the internal orientalist system of ethnic politics created by the CCP relies on a process of myth-making that emphasizes the colourful nature of the ‘other’ while also stressing that such exotic qualities render minorities as subtly dangerous. The party’s consistently negative depiction of Islam in a global context may unintentionally give rise to popular suspicion of domestic Muslim communities. A general climate of distrust and antipathy for Muslims may result as an unintended consequence of the CCP’s continually depicting global Islam as associated with violence and extremism. Such prejudices are rooted not in moments of contentious upheaval, but rather in day-to-day interactions that may magnify fear and suspicion of Muslims. Interactions with Muslim ethnic minorities outwardly engaging in Islamic practice in their daily lives contradict the de-Islamicized depictions put out by state media.

Further, by emphasizing only positive relations between Han and minorities, some activists may feel that state media neglects to comment on the perceived harm done to Han centrism by multiculturalism. To some Han netizens, the party state’s distribution youhui zhenghce (preferential policies for ethnic minorities) to Hui and Uyghurs is seen as coming at the expense of Han. Thus, Han netizens may see media coverage that trumpets the CCP’s success in aiding Muslim minorities as a celebration or policy that disadvantages Han. Ethnic minorities may seem to be ungrateful recipients of ‘misdirected generosity’ from the party state (Carrico, 2017, 86–87). One Han respondent I interviewed during my field research in Jinan expressed disdain for what she saw as ‘arrogant’ (jiao’ao) behaviour from the Hui—flaunting the privileges afforded them by the state and lording it over their Han neighbours.⁵

In the most extreme cases, Han netizens may see such promotion of youhui zhengce as threatening to Han culture itself. Chew and Wang’s (2012, 6) study of online Han cultural conservatives finds that some view preferential policy, like the previous exemption of minorities from China’s ‘One Child’ population control measures, as an ‘insidious device to suppress the growth of the Han ethnic group’. Because chauvinist netizens view these policies as occurring at the expense of the Han, seeing such positive coverage and special praise of Muslims in the pages of state-led newspapers may thus intensify these feelings and contribute to further backlash (Luqiu & Yang, 2018, 609).

Moreover, such carefully crafted messaging which portrays the party state as magnanimous and tolerant of multiculturalism may backfire if readers treat the rhetoric as no more than empty platitudes or propaganda. While coverage which stresses that China’s Muslim minorities are loyal, upstanding, grateful recipients of government aid may align with the party state’s intended message, the general public may baulk at such descriptions, regarding them as hollow or insincere. In the case of reporting on Muslims, the online discourse may reflect a feeling among netizens that the People’s Daily‘s positive, state-approved presentation of Hui and Uyghurs does not align with Han disaffection at perceived minority privilege given to these groups, particularly due to the CCP’s facilitation of youhui zhengce.

Given these resentments, the positive coverage of Muslims in The People’s Daily may further agitate ethnonationalist netizens. Rosy portraits of Hui and Uyghurs in official media may arouse the ire of netizens who view minorities as ungrateful recipients of China’s ‘civilizing’ aid at the expense of the Han. Descriptions of Hui or Uyghur culture, intended by official media to display a message of CCP benevolence and China’s tolerance for diversity, many be received by chauvinist netizens as an example of minorities’ arrogant unwillingness to assimilate into China’s mainstream. More darkly, these stories netizens may see these stories as a sign of festering Islamic extremism that threatens Han culture. Such a gap between official rhetoric and netizens’ perceptions of lived reality may drive them to reject state media framings of ethnic politics and air their own grievances on alternative social media platforms.

9 DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE STUDY

These findings point to a number of avenues for future study. Importantly, state media does not necessarily reserve these tactics using outside extremist threats as a foil for domestic unity for describing Muslims. Similar descriptions may be observed in the state media’s coverage of unrest in Tibet. Recent People’s Daily retrospectives on 70 years of PRC rule in Tibet insists that the region’s incorporation into the Chinese state has been nothing but beneficial to Tibetans.⁶ This coverage points to the advancement of literacy and the construction of modern infrastructure throughout the region, evidence of the benefits of Chinese rule and ‘liberation’ from the ‘Dalai clique’ (Barnett, 2010, 318). Further, it presents similar narratives of external actors using warped ideologies to undermine ethnic unity in China. Though the Dalai Lama does not call for independence, the state criticizes him, and the Tibetan government in exile.⁷ Media coverages fiercely characterizes his calls for genuine autonomy as ‘splittist’ and therefore threatening to China’s domestic stability and national security (Davis, 2007, 157–58). As it did with Muslim minorities, media coverage frequently externalizes the cause of resistance in Tibet as being inflamed by ‘hostile Western forces’ working with the ‘Dalai clique’ in reporting falsehoods (Smith, 2010, 6–7; Barnett, 2010, 330–331).⁸

The observance of similar patterns of describing Tibetans implies that state media applies the tactics of externalization of threat broadly to deal with popular discontent. Further comparative study using these cases might illustrate whether such directives for describing ethnic minorities are standard within the state media’s narrative strategies.

The findings in this study also point to opportunities for future studies to make comparisons between state media and sentiments expressed by netizens online. Even though the descriptions of Islam and Muslims that appeared in The People’s Daily between 2014 and 2018 presented China’s Islamic ethnicities positively, the sample period also saw the outbreak of online harassment of Muslims on platforms like Sina Weibo and Weixin. This proliferation of online Islamophobia presents an opportunity to explore the ways in which the internet opens new discursive space outside of the boundaries established by the official state line. In order to further explore this subject, future research might compare the way posters on Weibo and Weixin portrayed Islam and Muslims to those official accounts examined in this study.

Further, the discrepancies between the elite-driven narratives about Islam and Muslims disseminated through outlets like The People’s Daily and the popular Islamophobia espoused on internet platforms presents an opportunity for examining divergences between official state nationalism and everyday nationalism.⁹ Much of the online vitriol aimed at China’s Islamic communities expresses outrage at daily habits, such as keeping a halal diet or wearing a hijab, that are seen as out of sync with Chinese culture and societal values. These daily encounters with Islam may perpetuate a larger feeling of hostility towards Islam on the whole. Accordingly, looking at the daily experiences of the non-elite, mass public may allow for a better understanding of why Islamophobia persists despite such positive coverage from state media. A study of the everyday roots of Islamophobia among Han Chinese would also heed Jon Fox’s (2017) call for scholars to seek ‘the edges’ of ethnic and national identity by asking breaching questions and confronting the subject of ethnicity directly. By uncovering prejudices that might be considered taboo, aspects of identity that might otherwise remain taken for granted might emerge and present a more rounded picture of the content of both Islamophobia in China and Han majority ethnicity.

ENDNOTES

• 1The term minzu is used by the state to refer to China’s 56 officially recognized ethnic groups. While the state has often used the term to mean ‘nationality’ or ‘ethnic group’, translation of the term is the subject of scholarly debate, with many electing to leave the term untranslated. China’s 55 minority groups are referred to as shaoshu minzu.
• 2See, for example, depictions in international media outlets that depict the Hui as passive in contrast to Uyghur restiveness given in Jacobs (2016b) and Beech (2014).
• 3The Hui (population 10.6 million) and Uyghur (population 10 million) represent China’s two largest Islamic ethnic minority groups according to the 2010 national census. While the Hui and Uyghur are not China’s sole Islamic minorities (others include the Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Dongxiang, Salar, Tajik, Bonan, Uzbek and Tatar ethnic groups), they comprise approximately 89.25% of China’s 23 million Muslims; see “Sixth National Population Census of the People’s Republic of China, 2010.” 2013. Census. Beijing: National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China.
• 4Though state media is silent on what a state-sanctioned practice of Islam might entail, other messages from the party emphasize loyalty to the state and obedience of the law as core tenets of the faith. The nearly ubiquitous banners proclaiming ‘Love your country, Love your faith. Know the law, abide by the law’, (Ai guo ai jiao. Zhi fa, shou fa) and more recently ‘Love your country, Love the party’ (ai guo, ai dang) illustrate this. Likewise, the curriculum of scriptural interpretation (jiejing) promoted by the Chinese Islamic Association (CIA, Zhonguo Yisilanjiao Xiehui), which stresses patriotism and territorial and ethnic unity as core values of the faith is instructive. For more, see Glasserman’s (2016) discussion of jiejing and the CIA.
• 5Interviewed by author. November 11, 2015. Jinan.
• 6For example, see Wang Fei, “Xin Xizang 70 nian: kaifang retu, huoli Xizang,” The People’s Daily (Renmin Ribao), May 31, 2021, http://xz.people.com.cn/n2/2021/0531/c138901-34753445.html; Wang Yahui and Yang Ziyan, “‘Xizang heping jiefang yu fanrong fazhan’ baipishu zai Xizang fanxiang qianglie,” The People’s Daily (Renmin Ribao), May 23, 2021, http://xz.people.com.cn/n2/2021/0523/c138901-34740556.html.
• 7For example, see “‘Zangdu’ zuzhi hao wu hefa xing” The People’s Daily (Renmin Ribao), January 7, 2021, http://hb.people.com.cn/n2/2021/0107/c194063-34515148.html.
• 8For example, see “‘Zangdu” zuzhi hao wu hefa xing” The People’s Daily (Renmin Ribao), January 7, 2021, http://hb.people.com.cn/n2/2021/0107/c194063-34515148.html.
• 9Here, I draw on the body of recent scholarship in the field of everyday politics which encourages scholars to examine the routines and habits of daily life to find the political significance found therein. See Fox & Miller-Idriss, 2008; Goode & Stroup, 2015; Bonikowski, 2016.

APPENDIX A: CODES AND DESCRIPTIONS

Code name	Description
Advanced
Cosmopolitan	Described as being sophisticated, cultured, etc.; used especially with words like 文明.
Educated	Depicted as achieving high levels of education or as being intellectuals.
Entrepreneurial	Mentions of starting a business.
Innovative	Depicted as developing technology, making the way for progress, etc.
Integrated	Expressing a belief that group is blended in linguistically, culturally, religiously, or otherwise, to mainstream Chinese society; used with words like 融合.
Peaceful	Description of Islam as a “religion of peace” or Muslims as ‘peaceful’; used with words like 和平, 和谐.
Progressive	Described as embracing technology, progress, scientism, etc.
Prosperous	Described as having become rich or benefitted from development.
Secularized	Makes mention of unfamiliarity with Islamic traditions or practices.
Backward
Irresponsible	Depicted as not paying attention to obligations, responsibilities; social/economic, or otherwise.