An American mediation in Sudan? Can an enemy serve as a mediator? Is it reasonable, in Arab–Arab disputes, to request American mediation, when the United States has failed as a mediator in any of our causes? In Syria, they accept a so-called legitimate government in the hope of integrating Syria into the Abraham Accords; in Lebanon it is the same; in Saudi Arabia the same pattern; and in Libya, and so on. Washington intervenes in no Arab–Arab file except to impose normalization with the Zionist enemy. As for Sudan in particular, it will not even need pressure, as long as the Chief of Staff of the Sudanese Army, al-Burhan, normalized with the Zionist enemy even before the fire of sedition ignited in Sudan.
And what exactly will the American mediator mediate, when it supports both sides—al-Burhan and Hemedti—while at the same time being an ally of Saudi Arabia and the UAE? How, then, can Washington’s mediation be considered valid? Until now, despite all the UAE’s transgressions against Arab national security and the Palestinian cause, its laundering of Russian money, and its transformation into a safe haven for criminals and fugitives, Washington has not dared to punish or pursue it. Rather, the only thing it seems capable of is killing Venezuelans in international waters on suspicion of drug trafficking without conclusive evidence, and inserting itself into conflicts such as Sudan. And let us imagine what Trump will devise in the Sudan file, imposing it through pressure and threats on all Sudanese parties—and how unlikely it is that he will achieve his aims.
