لنستخرج كنوزا من المعرفة و الإبداع و العلم و الأفكار
fragility of the global nuclear taboo. One wonders whether another tacit reason for Biden’s unprecedented involvement—including his naval deployments and high-profile visit to Israel on Oct. 18—is to make sure that taboo is not shattered.
The culture of intelligence agencies paved the way for disaster. Regional war could revive the nuclear specter that haunted the
world in 1973.
The trauma that Israel suffered on Oct. 7 is both unprecedented and unthinkable by any Israeli historical measure. Never before has Israel experienced such a calamity in its 75-year history. Even Hamas never expected such operational success. Indeed, actors across the region, notably Hezbollah and Iran, were stunned by the success of the Hamas offensive.
One striking finding that only became known in recent days highlights the enormity of the Israeli intelligence blunder: Israeli military planners never considered such an attack, even in their worst-case scenarios. Indeed, the worst-case scenario conceived was a simultaneous attack on five to seven civilian settlements. Hamas’s offensive targeted nearly five times as many—and a music festival.
Surprises of this magnitude nurture the environment in which major strategic miscalculations could—and, indeed, are likely—to happen. Given the ongoing hostilities, it is important to understand the internal dynamics within Israel’s security establishment that led to the intelligence failure and the risks of unintended escalation, keeping in mind that Israel is an undeclared nuclear weapons state.
Israel’s two prime intelligence organizations tasked with providing a strategic warning alert as well as forestalling specific terrorist acts from Gaza are the General Security Service (known as Shabak or Shin Bet in Hebrew), which is in charge of human intelligence (HUMINT) but uses technological means, mainly signal intelligence (SIGINT) as well, and the Military Intelligence Directorate (known as Aman in Hebrew) of the Israel Defense Force (IDF), which uses mainly technical means of collection.
Israel’s warning system against either small- or large-scale terrorist attacks from Gaza relied on three main defense layers. The first, consisting mainly of the Shin Bet’s HUMINT sources, aimed to provide a warning that Hamas leadership had decided to plan, prepare, and execute a major offensive. The second layer, based on Aman’s SIGINT collection capabilities (units 8200 and 81) and imagery intelligence (Unit 9900), involved collecting evidence about Hamas’s actual preparations for the attack.
The third layer was the big ground barrier along the border with Gaza, which integrated physical obstacles, electronic sensors, and other visual means aimed at providing a last line of defense against any attempt to break into Israel. All three layers collapsed on the morning of Oct. 7. They did not provide any strategic warning on the nature and magnitude of the impending offensive.
At the root of this blunder appear to be two fundamental failures. The first is conceptual, as was famously the case in 1973: A false but steady and solid joint estimate from the Shin Bet and Aman that consisted of two elements: First, Israeli military and intelligence superiority would deter Hamas from initiating any major military act; and second, if Hamas launched such an attack, the Shin Bet and Aman would provide a timely warning.
Hamas’s relative restraint in recent years and its apparent interest in continuing the flow of cash from Qatar and increasing the number of Gaza residents allowed to work in Israel enhanced this concept in the collective psyche of Israel’s political, military, and intelligence leaders.
The adherence to the calming concept led senior officers to ignore warning indicators prior to the attack. Over the past several years, civilian amateurs near the border have monitored Hamas’s wireless communications in which troops organized and conducted endless training exercises in occupying Israeli settlements. In recent weeks, these officers received reports on irregular activities such as disguised farmers taking photos of the border fence and Hamas troops with maps observing military strongholds and settlements on the Israeli side, but disregarded them.
There was even an eleventh-hour chance to deter or minimize the attack: During the night of Oct. 6, Israeli intelligence detected some warning indicators that generated a series of late-night high-ranking consultations, but the flawed concept prevailed and no significant increase in the state of alert along the border was taken; the Shin Bet sent a few additional agents to the south, but Aman’s director, Maj. Gen. Aharon Halive, continued his vacation in Eilat and no major deployments were made.
