The latest violent conflagration to ignite from the decades-long smoldering of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is entering its sixth month and must be brought to an end as soon as possible. The Oct. 7, 2023, Hamas attack on Israel was the deadliest attack on civilians in Israel’s modern history and the biggest breach of Israeli security since 1973. For Palestinians, the devastating Israeli counterattack has been the largest disaster since the Nakba of 1948 and the Naksa of 1967. The massive Israeli retaliation has greatly degraded Hamas but has only further complicated Israel’s long-term political-strategic dilemma.

For the wider Middle East, the conflict reversed pre-Oct. 7 trends toward regional de-escalation and normalization; spread to or exacerbated conflict in Lebanon, Yemen, the Red Sea, Iraq, and Syria; as well as inflamed public opinion throughout the Arab and Muslim worlds. Iran and its proxies are once again riding the wave of pro-Palestinian, anti-Israeli sentiment, while ISIS, al-Qaeda, and other Sunni radical groups now have powerful new recruitment material for years to come. For the United States, anti-American sentiment is sky high, American military forces in the Middle East are under strain from intermittent attacks, and the US appears dangerously weak to both its partners and opponents, unable to influence its main regional ally, Israel, or to sustainably deter its main regional adversary, Iran and its proxies.

The consequences of the war so far have been devastating enough — both the initial Hamas attack on Israelis and, since then, the unrelenting destruction that has unfolded in Gaza, in addition to the regional repercussions mentioned above. A continuation of the war means tens of thousands more lives lost or broken in Gaza, and the risk that any of the regional conflict patterns could escalate out of control. A continuation also risks escalation along two pathways that have not occurred yet: a) a spillover of naval disruption into the Gulf region, which would drive a spike in energy prices and have global economic repercussions, and/or b) a major incident in or around the al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem, which would redefine this conflict from an Israeli-Palestinian one to one between Israel and the broader Muslim world — with dramatic repercussions.

A continuation of the war will also not bring significant strategic benefits for Israel. Hamas is already greatly degraded; like Hezbollah after 2006, despite its bluster, Hamas will for many years hence not be in a political or military position to drag Gazans into another war with Israel. Also, whether Israel takes Rafah or not, the longer-term strategic dilemma for the Jewish state will largely be the same, while the prospects for safely freeing the rest of the Israeli hostages held in Gaza may further diminish. Hamas as a movement will still exist. It can organize a long-term insurgency if Israel plans to maintain a full occupation of Gaza for the foreseeable future, or it can seek to rearm and regroup over time. The only way forward, therefore, relies on a political path that includes the Palestinian Authority, Arab states, the US, and the international community. All of that will only be made harder if tens of thousands more Palestinians are killed in conflict or extinguished by famine and disease — or if one of the aforementioned regional conflict pathways escalates out of control.

For both Israelis and Palestinians, the rebuilding of arrangements for human security will depend on the vision and diplomacy that begins the day after the fighting ends, not on the remaining battles of the ongoing war. It is urgent for all sides, including regional actors and the US, to bring that day much closer.

Link : https://mei.edu/publications/expert-views-what-needed-end-war-gaza